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CASE COMMENTARIES 
AGENCY 
In proving the existence of  an agency relationship, the burden of  proof  lies 
with the party asserting the validity of  the relationship and such party cannot 
rely solely on the statement of  the purported agent to prove its claim.  Barclay 
v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., No. W2008-02828-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 590, 2009 WL 2615821 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2009). 
By Sabrina Carlson 
Although a non-specific statement may form the basis for an express oral 
authority to act on a person‘s behalf, it may not replace an explicit written agreement 
to act as a person‘s attorney-in-fact, as a matter of  law.  In Barclay v. Kindred Healthcare 
Operating, Inc., the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that the burden of  proof  lies 
with the party asserting the validity of  an agency relationship.  Further, the party 
must rely on more than the statement of  the purported agent to prove its claim. 
In Barclay, Ernest Napier (―Napier‖) lived with his uncle, Odis Barclay 
(―Barclay‖).  During Napier‘s teenage years and throughout his adulthood, Napier 
and Barclay remained in close contact.  As Barclay aged, he entrusted Napier to 
deposit his social security check and pay his bills from a joint checking account that 
they both shared.  Barclay did not, however, expressly grant Napier his power of  
attorney. 
Upon admission to the Cordova Rehabilitation and Nursing Center 
(―Cordova‖) in February 2005, Barclay signed and executed his own ―Admissions 
Agreement‖ and ―Consent to Admission and Treatment.‖  A week later, Napier 
signed an optional arbitration agreement on Barclay‘s behalf.  The agreement was 
signed without Barclay‘s knowledge and was revocable up to 30 days after its 
execution. 
In March 2007, Casey Barclay, Barclay‘s son, filed an action in the circuit 
court for Shelby County, Tennessee against Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., 
d/b/a Cordova Rehabilitation and Nursing Center, for the wrongful death of  his 
father.  Casey Barclay argued against the validity of  the arbitration agreement 
because Barclay had neither appointed Napier to be his legal representative nor 
executed a power of  attorney in favor of  Napier.  Cordova responded by filing a 
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motion to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under the arbitration agreement.  
In May 2008, the trial court found that Napier was authorized to handle 
Barclay‘s financial affairs and to make medical decisions on his behalf.  The court 
held that Napier had express oral authority to bind Barclay to the optional arbitration 
agreement with Cordova and that the arbitration agreement signed by Napier was 
enforceable and not unconscionable.  The court denied Casey Barclay‘s plea for an 
interlocutory appeal, and in November 2008, the court entered both a final judgment 
and an order to dismiss the case. 
On appeal, the court of  appeals examined two issues: (1) whether non-
specific statements by an uncle to a nephew to ―take care of ‖ him gives the nephew 
express oral authority to act as the uncle‘s agent as a matter of  law, thus binding the 
competent uncle to an optional arbitration agreement at the time of  his nursing 
home admission; and (2) whether the trial court erred in finding that the arbitration 
agreement was not unconscionable.  Although the court of  appeals declined to 
address the issue of  unconscionability, the court reversed the trial court‘s dismissal 
and remanded the case for further proceedings.  The court held that in proving the 
existence of  an agency relationship, the burden of  proof  lies with the party asserting 
the validity of  the relationship and that such party cannot rely solely on the 
statement of  the purported agent to prove its claim. 
The court of  appeals resolved that Barclay did not expressly give Napier the 
oral authority to act as his agent as a matter of  law.  The court explained that Barclay 
had ample time to appoint Napier as his power of  attorney and that Napier‘s belief  
that he possessed that power was not ―sufficient to establish authority as a matter of  
law.‖  Additionally, the court cited Mitchell v. Kindred Healthcare Operating Inc., No. 
W2008-01643-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1684647 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 17, 2009) in 
determining that Cordova was ―not entitled . . . to simply rely upon someone who 
comes in and says, ‗I‘m the power of  attorney.  Let me sign the documents.‘‖   The 
documents explicitly required the signature of  the patient‘s legal representative or 
agent, and Cordova was aware that Napier had not signed the admission agreement 
in this capacity. 
Barclay v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc. serves as a reminder that in the 
absence of  an explicit written agreement to act as a person‘s attorney-in-fact, the 
testimony of  the purported agent may not be sufficient to establish the existence of  
an agency relationship.  This is especially important with regard to end of  life care, 
where all too often only the testimonies of  the purported agent and the healthcare 
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facility remain.  If  healthcare facilities allow purported agents to act on behalf  of  a 
patient without the patient‘s explicit written consent, healthcare facilities could find 
themselves embroiled in litigation, as arbitration agreements could be found invalid. 
To strengthen both agency relationships and arbitration agreements, 
practitioners must advise clients to put all such relationships in writing.  These 
writings should be explicit and list all of  the agent‘s responsibilities, including 
whether or not an agent may enter into an arbitration agreement on behalf  of  a 
client.  Practitioners should also review existing agreements to ensure that such 
agreements meet this standard. 
Furthermore, the holding in Barclay is important for practitioners because the 
court of  appeals invites the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Tennessee General 
Assembly to reconcile Tennessee‘s statutory provisions with the Tennessee Rules of  
Appellate Procedure.  While the general rule is that arbitration issues are decided in 
favor of  arbitration, the court of  appeals noted that questions regarding the 
formation of  arbitration agreements are contractual questions that must be decided 
by a court of  law.  After a court determines if  the agreement was valid, the court is 
then free to decide whether the agreement was unconscionable.  Tennessee Rule of  
Civil Procedure 54.02 permits the trial court to stay the matter in order to hear an 
interlocutory appeal of  its judgment on the validity of  the agreement.  The court of  
appeals explained that the trial court‘s use of  Tennessee Rule of  Appellate Procedure 
3 to dismiss ―the matter, making the trial court‘s judgment appealable as a final 
judgment . . . amounts to an end run around the statute.‖ 
BANKRUPTCY 
Bankruptcy courts may refuse to allow a creditor’s previous filings to qualify 
as an informal proof  of  claim where the creditor had ample notice of  the 
filing requirement and failed to provide an explanation for not filing.  In re 
Nowak, 586 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2009). 
By Lindy Degnan Harris 
In In re Nowak, the Sixth Circuit Court of  Appeals considered whether the 
bankruptcy court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a creditor‘s previous 
filings with the bankruptcy court to collectively qualify as an informal proof  of  
claim.  The Nowaks (―Debtors‖) executed a mortgage on their residence in favor of  
PCFS Financial (―Creditor‖).  Three years later, Debtor filed for Chapter 7 
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bankruptcy relief.  The trustee successfully voided Creditor‘s lien based on a 
technical error in the execution of  the mortgage instrument, and Creditor lost its 
secured status.  Creditor failed to file the required proof  of  claim, and the trustee‘s 
final report proposed no distribution to Creditor.  Creditor objected and moved the 
court to allow an informal proof  of  claim based on its prior filings as a secured 
creditor.  The court of  appeals found that the bankruptcy court had not abused its 
discretion by finding for the trustee. 
In Nowak, Debtors executed a mortgage on their residence in March 1998 
for $470,900 in favor of  Creditor.  Three years later, Debtors jointly filed for Chapter 
7 bankruptcy relief.  The trustee issued notices to the estate‘s creditors to file proofs 
of  claim.  At that time, Creditor was secured and was not required to file a proof  of  
claim pursuant to the Federal Rules of  Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 3002(a).  
Debtors received a bankruptcy discharge in 2001.  The trustee obtained an attorney 
pursuant to § 544 of  the United States Bankruptcy Code (―Code‖) and commenced 
an adversary proceeding for the purpose of  voiding Creditor‘s lien .  The basis for 
voiding the lien was that it was invalid under Ohio law because two people had not 
witnessed the execution of  the mortgage. 
Meanwhile, the trustee filed a notice of  intent to sell the residence on the 
basis that it was the subject of  a bona fide dispute.  Creditor filed an objection to the 
sale, claiming it was not the subject of  a bona fide dispute and that the sale price 
would be insufficient to satisfy the lien and would create a deficiency.  Creditor also 
filed a motion for relief  from the automatic stay and for the estate to abandon the 
residence to it. 
The bankruptcy court overruled Creditor‘s objection to the sale, and Creditor 
withdrew its motion for relief  from the automatic stay.  Subsequently, the court ruled 
that the mortgage was not executed with the proper formalities and entered an order 
voiding Creditor‘s lien on Debtors‘ residence, causing Creditor to be unsecured.  
Creditor appealed the court‘s decision to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (―BAP‖).  
While the appeal was pending, the trustee filed an amended intent to sell the 
residence, to which Creditor filed no objection.  The residence later sold for 
$300,000, and the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court‘s decision to void Creditor‘s 
lien. 
In January 2007, the trustee filed a final report and accounting, 
recommending a distribution of  funds to all unsecured creditors that filed proofs of  
claim.  This final report did not include Creditor, because it had made no proof  of  
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claim.  Creditor objected and moved the court to allow an informal proof  of  claim 
based on its previous filings collectively, including the motion for relief  from stay, 
documents that had been previously filed, and Debtor‘s testimony during the 
adversary proceeding.  The trustee argued that Creditor‘s claim should not be allowed 
because it had opportunity to file a formal proof  of  claim but failed to do so.  The 
bankruptcy court held in favor of  the trustee, finding that Creditor‘s previous filings 
did not constitute an informal proof  of  claim because they did not contain a 
demand on the estate and did not express intent to hold Debtors liable for the debt.  
As such, the court found that the equitable result was to disallow Creditor‘s informal 
proof  of  claim. 
The bankruptcy court reasoned that Creditor failed to file any of  the 
documentation prior to the deadline, that Creditor had not explained its failure to file 
a formal proof  of  claim, and that if  it allowed Creditor‘s claim, the other creditors‘ 
recovery would be reduced from 100% to 29%.  Thus, the court overruled Creditor‘s 
objection and denied its motion to allow an informal proof  of  claim. 
Creditor appealed the bankruptcy court‘s decision to the BAP.  The BAP held 
that Creditor‘s filings in the bankruptcy court did meet the requirements of  an 
informal proof  of  claim, but that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion 
by disallowing the proof  of  the claim as inequitable.  Creditor then appealed the 
decision of  the BAP. 
The Sixth Circuit reviewed the equitable decision under an abuse of  
discretion standard, determining whether a reasonable person could agree with the 
bankruptcy court‘s decision.  Generally, an unsecured creditor must file a proof  of  
claim in order to partake in the distribution of  the estate‘s assets. 1  A timely filed 
proof  of  claim is prima facie evidence of  the existence and amount of  a claim.  If  a 
proof  of  claim, however, is not filed prior to the deadline (known as the claims-bar 
date), exceptions are allowed in some cases to prevent an elevation of  form over 
substance where a creditor has failed to follow the strict formalities of  the Code, but 
has put all parties on sufficient notice of  its claim.  The court may allow a creditor to 
use its pre-bar date filings as an informal proof  of  claim and to amend those filings, 
post-bar date, to conform to Rule 3001‘s requirements. 
The bankruptcy court used the five-factor Sixth Circuit test set forth in In re 
                                                   
1
 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(a). 
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N.J. Waterman & Associates, Inc., 227 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2000).  According to this test, 
such filings must meet the following four elements to be considered an informal 
proof  of  claim: 
(1) The proof  of  claim must be in writing; (2) [t]he writing must 
contain a demand by the creditor on the debtor‘s estate; (3) [t]he 
writing must express an intent to hold the debtor liable for the debt; 
and (4) [t]he proof  of  claim must be filed with the bankruptcy court.  
If  those four elements are present, the court may examine a fifth 
factor – whether it would be equitable to allow the amendment of  
the informal proof. 
The fifth factor is an equitable determination within the discretion of  the 
bankruptcy court.  This standard is designed to protect the debtor and the other 
creditors who timely file their proofs of  claim and could be negatively affected by 
another creditor‘s failure to timely file, while not punishing those who filed 
improperly based on a technicality. 
A secured creditor is generally not required to file a proof  of  claim. 2  Where 
a creditor‘s lien on the collateral exceeds the value of  the property, however, that 
claim is partially unsecured and that creditor must file a proof  of  claim in order to 
receive any distribution from the estate.3  In addition, where a creditor‘s lien is 
successfully voided, as it was here, the creditor loses its secured status and therefore 
must file a proof  of  claim. 
In Creditor‘s appeal to the BAP, the sole issue presented was whether the 
bankruptcy court had abused its discretion by not allowing Creditor‘s proof  of  claim.  
In denying the informal proof  of  claim, the court relied on three factors.  The first 
factor was the length of  Creditor‘s delay in pursuing an unsecured claim, despite 
having clear notice that it might lose its secured status.  Further, even if  Creditor had 
won the adversary proceeding and not lost its secured status, the sale of  the home 
created an unsecured deficiency, for which a proof  of  claim was necessary.  The 
second factor was the lack of  any explanation from Creditor for the failure to file 
any formal proof  of  claim or for the delay in filing a motion for an informal proof  
                                                   
2
 Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002. 
3
 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002(a). 
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of  claim.  The court determined that Creditor was a ―sophisticated lender that [had] 
been represented by counsel throughout the proceedings,‖ and that its failure to file a 
timely claim was a ―self-inflicted wound.‖  The third factor was the significant 
reduction in the distribution amount that would be available to the other creditors if  
Creditor‘s claim were allowed. 
The BAP held that the bankruptcy court‘s determination was not 
unreasonable, and therefore was not an abuse of  discretion.  The opinion 
distinguished between a creditor that complied with the substance of  the bankruptcy 
rules but unwittingly failed to file the proper form, and the Creditor in the present 
case, who was a sophisticated lender with plenty of  notice that voluntarily failed to 
comply with the rules.  The BAP determined that reasonable minds could differ as to 
the balancing of  equities in this case, so no abuse of  discretion occurred. 
The BAP‘s decision should indicate to practitioners that an informal proof  
of  claim may be allowed, but only for its designated purpose: to avoid elevating form 
over substance where a filing is late or improper based on the intricacies of  the 
Code.  It is not designed to allow a creditor to supersede or navigate around the rules 
where the creditor easily could have complied with them.  Practitioners should note, 
however, that the BAP‘s decision was limited to review of  the lower court‘s weighing 
of  the equities under an abuse of  discretion standard, and it held that reasonable minds 
could differ on the subject.  Therefore, practitioners should not attempt to expand the 
scope of  this opinion by applying the precedent to all situations with similar facts. 
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 
In alleging breach of  fiduciary duty in a merger transaction, a plaintiff  must 
demonstrate that the directors failed to attempt to obtain the highest sale 
price where the directors are otherwise exculpated from liability relating to 
the duty of  care.  Wayne County Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, No. 3435-CC, 2009 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 126, 2009 WL 2219260 (Del. Ch. July24, 2009). 
By K. Chris Collins 
Courts applying the business judgment rule presume that a corporation‘s 
directors are making informed decisions in good faith and in the best interests of  the 
corporation.  This standard is applied within the context of  the business decision 
being made.  Therefore, in the context of  a merger, the courts will assume that the 
board is performing its fiduciary duties to achieve the maximum sale price for the 
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corporation‘s stock.  In Wayne County Employees’ Retirement System v. Corti, the Delaware 
Chancery Court granted a motion to dismiss, holding, in pertinent part, that the 
defendants in the case did not breach their duty of  loyalty. 
In Corti, Activision, Inc. (―Activision‖), a leading developer of  video games, 
entered into negotiations in late 2006 with Vivendi S.A. (―Vivendi‖), the 
manufacturer of  the popular game World of  Warcraft, regarding a possible merger.  
Prior to negotiations, Activision evaluated 17 other possible corporate matches.  On 
April 30, 2007, Activision‘s Board of  Directors (―Board‖) was informed of  the 
negotiations.  The Board was comprised of  eight directors, and of  the eight, only 
Robert Kotick (―Kotick‖), Co-Chairman of  the Board and Activision‘s CEO, and 
Brian Kelly (―Kelly‖), also Co-Chairman of  the Board, acted as primary negotiators 
throughout the negotiations. 
On December 1, 2007, Activision announced that a combination agreement 
with Vivendi had been reached.  Pursuant to that agreement, Vivendi would (1) 
contribute its subsidiary, Vivendi Games, to the combined corporation; (2) purchase 
newly issued shares of  Activision at a price of  $27.50 per share; and (3) possess an 
executable option to purchase up to 50% of  any remaining Activision shares at a 
price of  $27.50 per share.  Upon completion of  the merger, Vivendi owned 52% of  
Activision. 
The dispute in this case arose out of  the role Kotick and Kelly played in 
negotiations.  The plaintiff, a former shareholder of  Activision, Inc., alleged that 
Kotick and Kelly breached their duty of  loyalty by favoring their own interests in 
obtaining optimum employment benefits over the best interests of  the corporation‘s 
stockholders.  Plaintiff  also alleged that the remaining Board members breached 
their duty of  loyalty by permitting Kotick and Kelly to dominate negotiations. 
Because the Board was exculpated from any liability arising from breach of  
the duty of  care, the issue before the court was whether the members of  the Board 
had violated their duty of  loyalty, or otherwise acted in bad faith.  The court held 
that (1) the Board did not violate its duty of  loyalty, because both Kotick and Kelly 
were sufficiently disinterested in the negotiations; and (2) the Plaintiff  did not plead 
facts sufficient to overcome the presumption that the Board did not fail to attempt 
to achieve the highest price for the corporation‘s shares.  
As the court states, there is no monetary liability for failing to conduct the 
perfect merger.  As such, a plaintiff  must allege facts sufficient to overcome the 
presumption of  the business judgment rule.  The court found that Kotick and Kelly 
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were disinterested parties because their future with the company had already been 
determined, and there was nothing further for the two to gain.  Further, Kotick‘s and 
Kelly‘s employment extensions were signed by Activision, not Vivendi.  Therefore, 
the plaintiff  could only survive dismissal by demonstrating that the Board failed to 
attempt to obtain the highest sale price for the corporation‘s stock.  
The business judgment rule is a ―contextually based‖ rule.  It is applied in the 
specific context of  whichever business decision is being made.  That being the case, 
the court determined that the business judgment rule was to be applied in the 
context of  the potential merger. 
Activision‘s role in the merger was to give up the controlling share of  its 
stock.  Activision‘s only interest was to achieve a sufficient price level for its stock to 
support the feasibility of  the merger.  The business judgment rule was applied in the 
context of  that interest. Therefore, the plaintiff ‘s claims would fail unless he 
demonstrated that the Board ―knowingly and completely‖ failed to attempt to obtain that 
price level.  The court found that Activision‘s Nominating and Corporate 
Governance Committee, as well as its financial advisor, met routinely throughout the 
negotiations and considered several facts and analyses prior to agreeing to the 
merger.  Therefore, the presumption of  the business judgment rule could not be 
overcome by the plaintiff. 
This case is a demonstration of  the force of  the business judgment rule.  
Because courts apply the rule in the context of  the specific decision in interest, a 
plaintiff  is forced to plead facts that are both highly specific and material to that 
specific decision in interest in order to survive a motion to dismiss.  The business 
judgment rule, if  utilized properly, can serve as a strong shield for defendants in 
these types of  cases.  Attorneys representing the directors and decision makers of  
corporations need to consistently reinforce the application of  the business judgment 
rule in all transactions entered into by their clients on behalf  of  their respective 
corporations.  On the other hand, attorneys representing possible plaintiffs in these 
types of  cases need to impress upon their clients the high demand courts place on 
plaintiffs in demonstrating that the business judgment rule has been violated.  Not 
only do the plaintiffs need to plead facts that are material, but those facts must also 
be specifically tailored to the exact business decision being attacked.  If  they do not, 
they will likely not survive a motion to dismiss. 
Creditors of  an insolvent or near-insolvent corporation may assert a claim for 
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breach of  fiduciary duty against officers or directors who are also creditors of  
the corporation in cases involving self-dealing or preferential treatment.  
Sanford v. Waugh & Co., No. M2007-02528-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
402, 2009 WL 1910957 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
By S. Ryan Hoffman 
It is well settled that directors of  a corporation owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and its shareholders.  Less clear are the duties, if  any, owed by a director 
or officer to the creditors of  a corporation.  Certain jurisdictions hold that directors 
or officers owe no duties to a corporation‘s creditors, while others hold that fiduciary 
duties expand to the corporation‘s creditors only in limited circumstances.  In Sanford 
v. Waugh & Co., the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that fiduciary duties exist 
between corporate officers or directors and the corporation‘s creditors where the 
officers or directors are also creditors of  the insolvent (or near-insolvent) 
corporation and a preferential transfer or other self-dealing transaction is involved. 
In Sanford, a creditor of  the corporation, Michael Sanford, sued SecureOne, 
Inc. (―SecureOne‖) and its former directors and officers, claiming that he was owed 
$1,300,000.  In 1995, Sanford and Bruce Prow formed SecureOne, a close 
corporation that sold and serviced security systems as an authorized dealer for ADT 
Security Services, Inc. (―ADT‖).  Both individuals owned a 50% interest in 
SecureOne.  After a disagreement, Sanford agreed to sell his shares of  SecureOne to 
Prow and his wife for $3,000,000.  In this transaction, Sanford received $1,000,000 in 
cash, a secured promissory note for $2,000,000 (the ―Sanford Note‖), and a security 
agreement granting Sanford a security interest in all SecureOne assets. 
Prior to the stock sale, Prow borrowed money from his in-laws, Troy and 
Carol Waugh, to purchase the shares.  Without Sanford‘s knowledge, the Waughs 
purchased 25% of  SecureOne‘s stock for $100,000 and loaned SecureOne an 
additional $900,000.  In return, the Waughs received two promissory notes from 
SecureOne.  The first note was issued to the Waughs for $425,000, and the second 
was issued to Waugh & Co. for $475,000.  In addition to the notes, SecureOne 
executed a loan and security agreement, which listed the Prows as guarantors of  the 
$900,000 loan. 
After the transaction was completed, Troy Waugh called a meeting of  
SecureOne‘s board of  directors.  During this meeting, Bruce Prow was elected 
President and CEO, Leslie Prow was elected Treasurer and Vice President of  
Finance, Carol Waugh was elected Secretary, and Troy Waugh was elected Chairman 
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of  the Board.  SecureOne made payments on the Sanford notes from February 2003 
until December 2003.  At the same time, SecureOne was experiencing financial 
difficulties.  After sales declined in 2003, the Waughs extended a loan of  $70,000 to 
SecureOne.  In October 2003, after SecureOne defaulted, the Waughs foreclosed on 
the Prows‘ shares and became the outright owners of  SecureOne.  In December 
2003, the Waughs loaned SecureOne an additional $120,000 and received a security 
interest in SecureOne‘s house accounts.  After Sanford did not receive January or 
February 2004 payments, he met with the Waughs and learned that SecureOne was 
not able to pay him the $1,300,000 he was owed. 
Later that year, the Prows started a new company, Security Networks, which 
was a direct competitor of  SecureOne.  The Prows ran Security Networks and 
SecureOne out of  the same room in their home.  Bruce Prow purchased four 
vehicles from SecureOne, stored SecureOne equipment and furniture at the house, 
and transferred SecureOne‘s phone number to Security Networks.  Before its 
winding down, SecureOne received $1,173,213 from ADT pursuant to a franchise 
agreement.  In 2004, SecureOne paid Troy Waugh $75,000 and Carol Waugh $30,000 
for consulting fees.  Between 2003 and 2004, Waugh & Co. received $48,883 and the 
Waughs received $55,991 in interest payments from SecureOne. 
In February 2003, Sanford filed suit to enforce the Sanford Note against  
Leslie Prow and SecureOne.  SecureOne and Leslie Prow counterclaimed that 
Sanford had intentionally or negligently misrepresented SecureOne‘s financial 
condition at the time of  the stock sale.  Troy Waugh, Carol Waugh, and Waugh & Co. 
filed an action against Sanford in April 2004, also alleging that Sanford fraudulently 
misrepresented SecureOne‘s financial condition.  In March 2005, the Waughs 
voluntarily dismissed their complaint against Sanford.  In April 2006, Sanford was 
awarded a judgment of  $1,560,000 against Leslie Prow and SecureOne (the 
―SecureOne Judgment‖). 
On April 13, 2005, after the Waughs dismissed their complaint and before 
the SecureOne Judgment, Sanford filed a complaint against Waugh & Co., and Troy 
and Carol Waugh individually.  In the complaint in which he sought compensatory 
and punitive damages, Sanford alleged causes of  action for abuse of  process, 
malicious prosecution, breach of  fiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance, conspiracy, 
and conversion.  The essence of  Sanford‘s claim was that the Waughs and the Prows 
―engaged in a course of  conduct they knew would prevent SecureOne from paying 
Sanford and acted for their own benefit.‖  Sanford listed seven instances of  alleged 
fraudulent conveyances, including: (1) payments by SecureOne to Security Networks; 
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(2) rent payments by SecureOne to Leslie Prow for property that she did not own; 
(3) payments by SecureOne to the Waughs for ―consulting‖ services that were not 
performed; (4) interest payments by SecureOne to the Waughs; (5) payments by 
SecureOne for the Prows‘ legal and accounting bills; (6) sale of  SecureOne assets to 
Security Networks; and (7) the sale of  SecureOne assets over Sanford‘s perfected 
liens.  Sanford claimed that the Waughs had no basis for the fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim and that they only brought the claim to delay the payment 
of  money owed under the Sanford Note. 
The most important aspect of  the Sanford decision is the treatment of  
Sanford‘s claim of  breach of  fiduciary duties.  The lower court found that Sanford 
could not bring a direct action against the officers and directors of  an insolvent 
corporation because he was only a creditor of  the corporation.  Further, the trial 
court determined that Sanford would only have standing if  he was to file a derivative 
action on behalf  of  all SecureOne creditors.  The court of  appeals reversed, finding 
that a creditor may directly pursue such a course of  action in limited circumstances. 
The court began by recognizing the general rule that, as agents of  the 
corporation, officers and directors are liable only to the corporation; therefore, they 
usually do not have a fiduciary relationship with the corporation‘s creditors.  The 
court recognized, however, that a ―majority of  the jurisdictions have held that an 
officer or a director may owe a fiduciary duty to corporate creditors, especially when 
the corporation becomes insolvent and the insider has a personal pecuniary interest 
in the corporation.‖ 
The court pointed to Intertherm, Inc. v. Olympic Homes Systems, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 
467 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978), which ―recognized that officers and directors have a duty 
not to act to the unfair detriment of  certain interested third parties lacking the power 
of  a fiduciary.‖  The court read Intertherm to allow minority shareholders and 
creditors to ―challenge the good faith and fairness of  transactions between majority 
shareholders, officers, or directors of  the corporation.‖  Because Sanford raised 
legitimate questions about whether the Waughs intended to prefer the debts of  other 
creditors as a direct target against him, Sanford was allowed to file an action 
individually, rather than derivatively on behalf  of  all SecureOne creditors.  Reviewing 
the law of  other jurisdictions, the court noted that the majority rule does not allow 
an insolvent corporation to prefer its own directors or officers over other creditors.  
The reason for this rule is that corporate officers and directors cannot use their 
inside knowledge to benefit themselves at the expense of  non-insider creditors.  
Specifically, when a corporation becomes insolvent, directors and officers have a 
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fiduciary relationship with and a corporate duty to corporate creditors because of  
their position and control over corporate assets.  Therefore, the directors or officers 
cannot secure any preference or advantage that gives them priority over other 
creditors by using the powers that result from their position. 
Adopting the majority rule, the court held that: 
[A] creditor to an insolvent corporation or a corporation on the verge 
of  insolvency may assert an action for breach of  fiduciary duty 
against officers or directors who are also creditors of  the corporation 
when they have been given preference in their preexisting debt or 
have engaged in self-dealing conduct. 
The court reasoned that the limitation of  the creditor‘s right to bring such an action 
to cases involving self-dealing and preference avoids any conflict between the 
director‘s duty to ―maximize the value of  the insolvent corporation for the benefit of  
all those having an interest in it, and the newly recognized direct fiduciary duty to 
individual creditors.‖  Finding that genuine issues of  material fact existed as to 
whether the Waughs were given insider preferential treatment, the court reversed the 
trial court‘s dismissal of  Sanford‘s breach of  fiduciary duty claim and remanded the 
issue to allow Sanford to present evidence related to a self-dealing transaction to a 
jury. 
By recognizing the individual creditor‘s right to sue for breach of  fiduciary 
duties, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals in Sanford expanded the non-bankruptcy 
remedies for corporate creditors.  This presents a new concern for corporate clients 
facing insolvency.  In addition to bankruptcy remedies, which would allow a 
corporate creditor to set aside a preferential transfer, Sanford affords the corporate 
creditor a right to sue the corporation directly and recover compensatory damages 
for economic harm suffered as a result of  this transfer. 
Tennessee transactional attorneys should advise their insolvent or near-
insolvent corporate clients of  this increased risk associated with preferential transfers 
in order to prevent liability on a creditor‘s suit for breach of  fiduciary duty.  
Therefore, if  a client is contemplating bankruptcy and has made a transfer on 
account of  a debt owed to a corporate insider within the last year, attorneys should 
advise their clients not to file a petition.  Tennessee‘s adoption of  a new fiduciary 
duty raises the stakes much higher than having the transfer set aside.  Now, the 
directors and officers of  corporate clients may find themselves in a much worse 
position by being held liable for damages resulting from a breach of  their fiduciary 
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duty to the corporation‘s creditors. 
Where one business owner personally pays more shared business debt than a 
co-business owner, the right-of-contribution doctrine permits recovery from 
the lesser contributing owner in the amount paid exceeding the owners’ 
contractual obligations under the company ownership agreement.  Thompson 
v. Davis, No. W2008-00380-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 613, 2009 WL 
2868820 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 8, 2009). 
By Steven J. Stuart 
Although successful business ventures can produce immense opportunity 
and wealth, poorly managed business ventures involve great risk and can have long-
lasting consequences for the business and its partners.  Misunderstandings among 
business partners, stress, tarnished reputations, and damaged relationships may all 
stem from a mismanaged business venture.  This is especially true when a business 
venture requires sizable personal capital contributions.  Differing amounts of  capital 
contributions among business partners may affect the business venture‘s success and 
impair the business partners‘ understanding of  the venture‘s financial health. 
In Thompson v. Davis, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed whether two 
business partners could succeed in a right-of-contribution action against a third, 
lesser contributing business partner.  The court held that because each partner was 
equally liable for business debts, the two business partners could recover the 
payments that exceeded their financial obligations under the ownership agreement 
from the lesser contributing partner. 
In Thompson, Jon Thompson, Ed Gatlin (collectively, ―Plaintiffs‖), and J.T. 
Davis, M.D. (―Defendant‖) formed and operated a Tennessee corporation, Memphis 
Arena Football, Inc.  Soon after its 1995 formation, the corporation bought an Arena 
Football League (―AFL‖) franchise.  In 1996, the corporation was converted to a 
limited liability company (―Company‖) in which Plaintiffs and Defendant maintained 
equal ownership.  From 1996-2002, the Company operated the AFL franchise in 
three states with an overall financial loss.  In 2002, Plaintiffs and Defendant sold the 
franchise back to the AFL for $5.8 million. 
Throughout their business venture, Plaintiffs and Defendant held informal 
meetings at a café to discuss company financials.  Initially, the parties equally infused 
cash into the Company as needed.  However, in more recent years, Defendant 
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stopped contributing, while Plaintiffs continued to make contributions with the 
understanding that repayment would come from the Company or directly from 
Defendant.  Thus, Plaintiffs each contributed their share of  the Company‘s cash 
requirements, plus half  of  Defendant‘s share.  In sum, Plaintiffs contributed close to 
$1 million more to the Company than Defendant.  Repeatedly, Defendant turned 
down Plaintiff ‘s buyout offers and increasingly distanced himself  from the 
Company‘s finances, admitting, ―[i]t got so depressing for me, I never kept up with 
it.‖  From 2001-03, Plaintiff  Gatlin received $229,418 in disbursements, Plaintiff  
Thompson received $166,845, and Defendant received $25,466.  Plaintiffs 
maintained that their disbursements were repayments from their loans to the 
Company. 
Two loans were central to the case.  In December 2001, all three partners 
jointly took out a $300,000 personal loan from Trustmark National Bank of  Bartlett 
(―Trustmark‖).  Executing a promissory note in favor of  Trustmark (the ―Trustmark 
Note‖), the parties loaned the proceeds to the Company.  At the time the parties sold 
their franchise back to the AFL, the Company had $18,474 remaining on the note.  
Subsequently, Plaintiffs collectively paid $17,800 to the Company, and the Company 
paid Trustmark the balance due.  Defendant did not contribute to the $17,800 
payment. 
In September 2002, all three individuals took out a second loan of  $2.5 
million from First Bank of  Lexington (―First Bank‖).  Executing a promissory note 
in favor of  First Bank (the ―First Bank Note‖), the parties loaned the proceeds to the 
Company.  At the time they sold the franchise back to the AFL, the Company had 
$392,122 remaining on this note.  In December 2003, after they filed this lawsuit, 
Plaintiffs personally bought the First Bank Note and executed another note in favor 
of  First Bank.  By doing so, Plaintiffs and the Company avoided $45,000 in late fees.  
Again, Defendant abstained from this transaction. 
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in October 2003.  Thereafter, the circuit court 
denied Plaintiffs‘ November 2004 motion for summary judgment as to Defendant‘s 
liability for contribution under a partnership theory of  recovery.  In their subsequent 
June 12, 2006 amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was liable pursuant 
to § 47-3-116 of  the Tennessee Code for his pro-rata contribution of  debts owed by 
all parties, but paid for by Plaintiffs.  In November 2006, Defendant filed an answer 
denying complete liability to Plaintiffs.  Defendant claimed to be entitled to offset his 
liability to the extent of  any improper company distributions.  Further, Defendant 
maintained that because the Company, not Plaintiffs, discharged the Trustmark Note 
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debt, Plaintiffs were not entitled to Defendant‘s contribution from that debt‘s 
discharge.  The trial court found, however, that because Plaintiffs directly funded the 
Company‘s Trustmark Note debt payment, Plaintiffs were entitled to contribution 
from Defendant.  Ultimately, Defendant was held liable to Plaintiffs for one-third of  
the Trustmark and First Bank Notes.  The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay 
Plaintiffs‘ attorney fees. 
On appeal, Defendant contested his liability for his pro-rata share of  the 
First Bank and Trustmark Note balances.  Tennessee case law describes the right of  
contribution as being couched in principles of  equity and natural justice.  Section 47-
3-116(a) of  the Tennessee Code ―authorizes an action for contribution when one 
party having joint and several liability on a note pays the entire instrument.‖  The 
right of  contribution arises once another contract debtor pays more than his fair 
share of  the joint obligation. 
Regarding the First Bank Note, Defendant argued that Plaintiffs received 
improper LLC distributions of  capital of  $345,332 related to the First Bank Note 
payoff.  Plaintiffs argued that the distributions were loan repayments, from the  
Company to Plaintiffs, for the First Bank Note.  The trial court held that the 
distributions were loan repayments to Plaintiffs.  Finding that the evidence did not 
preponderate against the trial court‘s holding, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
affirmed. 
Regarding the Trustmark Note, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the 
trial court‘s holding that Plaintiffs personally discharged the Trustmark Note debt.  
With an analysis similar to the trial court‘s, the court of  appeals found that Plaintiffs‘ 
payments to the Company were intended for and actually used for the Company‘s 
Trustmark Note payoff.  Therefore, the court held that Plaintiffs‘ payments to the 
Company served as Plaintiffs‘ personal discharge of  debt of  the Company, and 
affirmed the trial court‘s doctrine of  contribution application.  Since Plaintiffs paid 
more than their fair share of  the joint obligations, the court held that Plaintiffs could 
recover against Defendant for his pro-rata share of  the First Bank and Trustmark 
Notes. 
As Thompson v. Davis illustrates, business ventures should always be managed 
vigilantly.  Although most people do not relish discussing unsuccessful financial 
ventures, thorough documentation and understanding among business partners can 
manage spiraling financial losses and partners‘ expectations.  When subsequent cash 
infusions are required to maintain a business venture‘s operations, business partners 
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should strive for complete transparency and understanding of  those financial 
sources. 
In situations such as that in Thompson v. Davis, Tennessee attorneys should 
inform their clients that stated business ownership percentages are crucially 
important.  Equal ownership means each business partner has equal financial 
responsibilities.  Clients should be advised to regularly update and document 
ownership percentages, capital contributions, and distributions.  Further, Tennessee 
attorneys, advising both business owners and business suppliers, should advise their 
clients of  the consequences inherent to the right of  contribution.  A closer look at 
the actual sources of  a business‘s financing and cash flows may clarify whether there 
will be enough cash to adequately meet the business‘s financial requirements after all 
due owners take their cut. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Tennessee’s new, more stringent summary judgment standard makes it more 
difficult to get summary judgment against claims of  fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation in contract disputes.  Biancheri v. Johnson, 2009 Tenn. App. 
LEXIS 274, 2009 WL 723540 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2009). 
By Christopher M. Smith 
In Biancheri v. Johnson, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals considered whether a 
contract dispute involving alleged fraudulent or negligent misrepresentations was 
appropriate for summary judgment.  The parties disagreed on what material 
representations were made during negotiations and whether a party would be 
justified in relying on such statements if  they were made.  Because these quest ions 
involved disputed issues of  fact, the court of  appeals applied Tennessee‘s new, higher 
summary judgment standard and reversed the trial court‘s summary judgment.  
In the 2008 case of  Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., the Tennessee Supreme 
Court raised the standard that a party must meet to prevail on summary judgment in 
Tennessee courts.  In addition to showing ―that there are no genuine issues of  
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of  law,‖ 
Tennessee courts require one of  two steps: the moving party must present evidence 
either ―(1) affirmatively negating an essential element of  the nonmoving party‘s 
claim; or (2) showing that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of  
the claim at trial.‖  A mere ―assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence‖ is 
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not enough to win on summary judgment in Tennessee courts.  
In Biancheri, Theresa Biancheri (―Biancheri‖), trustee of  the Mercer Family 
Trust, attempted to sell the Mercer family house through real estate agent Ida Louis 
Cromwell (―Cromwell‖) to Charles and Vikki Johnson (the ―Johnsons‖).  Both 
parties entered into a sales contract and moved toward closing the deal.  The 
Johnsons claimed that Cromwell made two representations during negotiations that 
induced the Johnsons to purchase the house: first that the late Mr. Mercer died in an 
ambulance outside the house; and second, that the integrated television system in the 
downstairs living room would stay with the house. 
As it turned out, the Mr. Mercer had actually been shot to death inside the 
house and the only piece of  audio-visual equipment left in the downstairs living 
room was an inoperable television monitor.  When the Johnsons discovered these 
two facts, they refused to attend the closing to complete the purchase of  the house. 
Biancheri sued the Johnsons for breach of  contract for failing to complete 
the purchase.  The Johnsons brought a counterclaim, alleging that (1) Cromwell 
breached the contract by removing the television equipment after saying ―all  this is 
included;‖ and (2) the contract was void because of  Cromwell‘s misrepresentation 
regarding Mr. Mercer‘s death inside the house.  Cromwell denied making both 
statements.  The Johnsons also filed a separate action against Cromwell, ―alleging 
fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory fraud, fraud in the inducement, 
negligent misrepresentation, and violations of  the Tennessee Consumer Protection 
Act.‖ 
In sum, all of  the claims involved either fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation.  To prevail on a fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the Johnsons 
would have to prove that Cromwell knowingly or recklessly made a false 
representation to them regarding a material fact, and that they ―reasonably relied on 
the misrepresented material fact‖ and ―suffered damages as a result.‖  To prevail on a 
negligent misrepresentation claim, the Johnsons would have to prove that Cromwell 
supplied false information to the Johnsons after failing ―to exercise reasonable care 
in obtaining or communicating the information,‖ and that the Johnsons ―justifiably 
relied on the information‖ when they entered the sales contract.  
Under either of  the two theories, the main points of  dispute were (1) what 
material misrepresentations, if  any, did Cromwell make to the Johnsons; and (2) 
whether the Johnsons ―justifiably relied on‖ any such misrepresentations in entering 
the contract. 
2010]                                       CASE COMMENTARIES                                                      237 
Biancheri and Cromwell filed for summary judgment, arguing that ―the 
Johnsons could not establish justifiable reliance, which is an essential element for 
both negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation.‖  Despite 
Tennessee‘s new rule that a mere ―assertion that the nonmoving party has no 
evidence‖ is insufficient to get summary judgment, the trial court granted the motion 
for summary judgment against the Johnsons, dismissed all of  the Johnsons‘ claims, 
and awarded Biancheri liquidated damages of  $20,000 in earnest money that the 
Johnsons had paid toward the purchase.  The Johnsons appealed the summary 
judgment and the dismissal of  their claims.  Biancheri and Cromwell appealed the 
limited award of  liquidated damages. 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals reversed the trial court‘s 
summary judgment and the award of  $20,000 to Biancheri and Cromwell.  The court 
applied Tennessee‘s new summary judgment standard to find that the defendants 
could not establish the undisputed facts necessary to either ―affirmatively negat[e] an 
essential element of  the [Johnsons‘] claim . . . or show[] that the [Johnsons] cannot 
prove an essential element of  the claim at trial.‖  Therefore, the defendants could not 
get summary judgment under the new standard. 
The key to the court‘s reasoning was that the material facts of  the case were 
legitimately in dispute.  Biancheri and Cromwell first argued that Cromwell never 
made the two alleged statements about Mr. Mercer‘s death and the television system.  
They then argued that, assuming Cromwell did make those statements, the Johnsons 
did not reasonably rely upon the statements in making the purchase.  The Johnsons, 
of  course, disagreed on both counts.  The court found that these were the types of  
genuine issues of  material fact that cannot be decided as a matter of  law.  Instead, 
these types of  material facts must be hashed out at trial, where the fact finder can 
evaluate witness credibility to decide which facts to believe.  ―Whether a plaintiff ‘s 
reliance on an alleged misrepresentation is reasonable is generally a question of  fact,‖ 
the court explained, ―and thus, is generally not appropriate for summary judgment.‖  
Biancheri shows that Tennessee courts are serious about applying their new, 
higher burden of  proof  for summary judgment in the context of  contract disputes.  
Specifically, this case illustrates that it will be difficult to get summary judgment 
against claims of  fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation for two reasons.  First, 
there will often be genuine issues of  material fact.  Second, a mere statement that the 
plaintiff  cannot prove his case is insufficient to get summary judgment under the 
new standard.  Biancheri and Cromwell learned this lesson the hard way:  They lost 
summary judgment and the court assigned half  of  the appeal‘s costs to Biancheri‘s 
238          TRANSACTIONS:  THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW      [VOL. 11 
trust and half  to Cromwell and her real estate company.  For a Tennessee attorney 
seeking summary judgment against a claim of  fraudulent or negligent 
misrepresentation, Biancheri is now required reading. 
CONSUMER PROTECTION 
Misrepresentations made to increase confidence in a product and induce 
reliance are not protected against a claim for fraud or violation of the 
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, even where ordinary diligence would 
have revealed the defect.  Bradley v. All Am. Classics of Tenn., Inc., No. M2008-
01738-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 138, 2009 WL 1034797 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. April 16, 2009). 
By Ashley Speth 
The buyer in Bradley v. All American Classics of Tennessee, Inc., relying on 
representations on the seller‘s website and claims from the seller‘s employees 
regarding the quality of the car, purchased a car from the seller without inspecting it.  
Because the car was not as represented, the buyer tried to return the car for a full 
refund, but the seller refused.  As a result, the buyer brought suit against the seller 
based on fraud and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed the trial court‘s decision and held 
that even where a plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary diligence by not inspecting the 
car at issue, the defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict where reasonable 
minds could disagree as to whether a reasonable inspection was required in light of 
the deceptive practices employed by a defendant.  The court also held that a plaintiff 
is not required to perform an inspection prior to purchase, where the plaintiff 
detrimentally relied upon the defendant‘s deception. 
In Bradley, Mark Bradley (―Bradley‖) bought a 1968 Dodge Charger from All 
American Classics of Tennessee, Inc. (―All American‖) without inspecting the car.  
Because Bradley was residing in California, he relied on representations made by 
employees of All American, photographs of the car, and claims made on All 
American‘s website.  The car Bradley received was not in the condition All American 
represented.  All American refused to take the car back or refund the purchase price, 
and Bradley brought suit for fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer 
Protection Act (―TCPA‖).  This case has substantial significance today, as many 
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purchases are now made online, as opposed to historically prevalent face-to-face 
transactions. 
Bradley, a native of the United Kingdom, found an advertisement for a 1968 
Dodge Charger on All American‘s website.  The ad included information regarding 
price, engine, color, etc., as well as several claims regarding the condition of the car.  
The ad stated that the car was rust-free, the brakes were rebuilt and operating 
properly, and that the car‘s ―numbers [were] matching.‖  An employee of All 
American told Bradley that the car ―needed nothing,‖ and that the engine had been 
rebuilt a year ago and was ―mechanically perfect.‖  Relying upon these assertions, as 
well as those represented by the pictures, Bradley purchased the car for $36,000.  
Upon delivery, Bradley noticed several problems with the car and took it to 
A & E Automotive for a full inspection.  The inspector‘s report stated, ―I found so 
many things wrong with this car that I could not believe someone had the nerve to 
sell this car for the money they were asking.‖  The inspector noted specific problems 
with the underbody, brakes, engine, and transmission.  According to his general 
overview of the car, the inspector considered the car a ―worn out rust bucket that 
had superficial cosmetic enhancement done to make the car appear that it was in 
good condition.‖  On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the 
―ordinary diligence‖ requirement relied upon by the trial court is moot where the 
defendant engaged in lies ―calculated to lull the suspicions of a careful man into a 
complete reliance thereon.‖ 
The elements of a fraud claim are: (1) intentional misrepresentation of a 
material fact; (2) the representation was made knowingly or recklessly without regard 
to its truthfulness; (3) reasonable reliance resulting in damages; and (4) the 
misrepresentation relates to a fact, either current or past.  While the defense focused 
on the third requirement of reasonable reliance, the court found that a reasonable 
person could find that Bradley justifiably relied on the website and photographs.  
The court stated that the Internet has ―revolutionized commerce,‖ and while it may 
be reasonable for someone nearby to inspect the merchandise, the same may not be 
necessary for a person farther away.  A reasonable man should be able to rely upon 
representations made via a company‘s website when it would be unreasonable for 
him to travel to inspect the item. 
The pictures sent to Bradley were taken from an angle that hid defects that 
would have been discovered through an inspection.  Similarly, the website contained 
many lies and misrepresentations regarding the condition of the car.  The court 
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stated that a company cannot fill its website with lies and misrepresentations and 
expect to be immune from liability simply because the customer did not inspect the 
item before proceeding with the transaction. 
Whether Bradley justifiably relied on the representations made by All 
American must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances.  The court 
found that in light of the misrepresentations on the website, lies told by the All 
American employees, and intentional acts to conceal defects with the car, it could 
not determine whether Bradley was unreasonable in relying on these representations.  
As a result, the court reversed the trial court‘s order of a directed verdict on the 
fraud claim. 
Liability under the TCPA can only be found where there has been an unfair 
or deceptive act by the defendant; there is no requirement of reliance.  An act is 
unfair under the TCPA if it ―causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers .‖  The court found that 
misrepresentations and the distance between participants in a transaction could be 
obstacles to the ―free exercise of consumer decision-making.‖  The court held that it 
could not definitively state whether Bradley could have reasonably avoided the injury 
and reversed the trial court‘s ruling of a directed verdict on the TCPA claim.  
This case could have a substantial impact in the field of consumer protection 
law, especially with the growing number of online transactions.  Bradley demonstrates 
that when a company engages in fraud and misrepresents its products, it will no 
longer be protected from liability simply because a customer cannot inspect the 
items.  The Internet has increased the distance between which consumers and sellers 
can do business.  It is no longer reasonable to require all customers to inspect a 
product before purchasing. 
Where there is fraud or misrepresentation, transactional lawyers representing 
plaintiffs should be aware that their clients could have a valid claim for fraud or 
violation of the TCPA regardless of whether their client inspected the product.  
Transactional lawyers representing online sellers should advise their clients that they 
will no longer be able to rely on a customer‘s failure to inspect an item to defeat a 
claim for fraud or violation of the TCPA.  If a company posts lies and misrepresents 
its products on its website, it can be found liable. 
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CONTRACTS 
A contract must be inherently illegal to violate public policy, and affirmative 
defenses must be appropriately pled to avoid waiver.  Vintage Health Res., Inc. v. 
Guiangan, No. W2008-01288-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 567, 2009 WL 
2601327 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2009). 
By Kevin Hartley 
In Vintage Health Resources, Inc. v. Guiangan, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals 
applied Tennessee law and held that the affirmative defense of  unconscionability 
must be pled to avoid waiver, and that a contract is not unconscionable where its 
terms are fair and favorable, rather than ―one-sided,‖ ―unreasonably harsh,‖ or 
―oppressive.‖  Likewise, the court ruled that a contract does not violate public policy 
unless its terms or purpose are inherently illegal.  Finally, the court determined that 
injunctive relief  should be used sparingly and only if  it is not ―broader than 
necessary to achieve its purposes.‖ 
In Vintage Health, James Jose Guiangan (―Guiangan‖), a nurse living in the 
Philippines, signed an employment agreement in March 2004 with Vintage Health 
Resources, Inc. (―Vintage‖), a company that provides health care workers to 
employers in the United States and commonly recruits from the Philippines.  Under 
the agreement, Guiangan committed to a three-year term of  employment with 
Vintage in exchange for several benefits, including free transportation and housing 
until he began his new job.  Vintage classified the aforementioned costs as free 
during Guiangan‘s recruitment.  Despite this representation, upon Guiangan‘s arrival 
in the United States, he was informed that his transportation and housing costs 
would actually be deducted from a stipend he would receive each month until his 
employment began.  Nonetheless, the stipend resulted in a net of  $300 dollars a 
month for Guiangan. 
Vintage and Guiangan maintained an amicable working relationship until 
September 2005.  At that time, approximately one year into Guiangan‘s three-year 
term of  employment, Guiangan e-mailed a letter to Vintage‘s Senior Vice-President, 
informing him that he would be resigning.  Vintage responded by holding a meeting 
with Guiangan to discuss his future.  During the meeting, Vintage management 
attempted to convince Guiangan to rethink his position.  When Guiangan refused, 
the Vice President for Operations warned Guiangan that if  he resigned, Vintage 
would report him to immigration officials for breaching his employment agreement.  
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Vintage reserved this right in the employment agreement. 
Following the meeting, Vintage sent Guiangan a letter informing him that if  
he resigned, Vintage would file a lawsuit for breach of  the employment contract and 
would seek his deportation or denial of  his application for citizenship.  Still defiant, 
Guiangan resigned in October 2005.  As such, Vintage filed suit.  In response, 
Guiangan asserted, among other things, that his employment agreement was void as 
contrary to public policy and counterclaimed that Vintage breached the agreement 
by failing to provide him with the same benefits he was promised during recruitment. 
The trial court held that Guiangan‘s employment agreement was 
unenforceable because it was unconscionable and contrary to public policy.  
Moreover, the trial court determined that Vintage breached the agreement by 
providing Guiangan with benefits different from those promised during his 
recruitment.  As a result, the court issued two injunctions: one provided that Vintage 
could no longer threaten to report employees to immigration officials, and the other 
prevented the company from continuing to use recruitment materials that differed 
from the actual employment agreements signed by employees. 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that the contract was not 
unconscionable because Guiangan never pled unconscionability, which is an 
affirmative defense.  According to Tennessee Rule of  Civil Procedure 8.03, 
affirmative defenses must be asserted in appropriate pleadings.  Guiangan never 
actually pled unconscionability, but argued that his defense asserting the employment 
agreement violated public policy sufficed as an unconscionability claim.  The court 
determined that violation of  public policy and unconscionability are distinct issues; 
therefore, they must each be pled appropriately.  Thus, the court concluded that 
Guiangan waived his right to assert the defense of  unconscionability because he 
failed to plead it. 
Additionally, the court held that, even if  Guiangan had properly pled 
unconscionability, the contract was not unconscionable.  A contract is 
unconscionable when its ―provisions are so one-sided, in view of  all the facts and 
circumstances, that the contracting party is denied any opportunity for meaningful 
choice.‖  The court reasoned that the employment agreement between Guiangan and 
Vintage was not ―one-sided,‖ and that the evidence did not prove that Guiangan was 
left without a ―meaningful choice.‖  As such, the court reversed the ruling of  the trial 
court and held that the employment agreement was not unconscionable.  
Likewise, the court ruled that Guiangan‘s contract was not contrary to public 
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policy.  A contract does not violate public policy unless it harms the public good or 
conflicts with Tennessee‘s constitution, laws, or judicial decisions.  More specifically, 
courts will not hold that a contract is contrary to public policy unless the impropriety 
is inherent in the terms or purpose of  the contract.  First, the court reasoned that 
the purpose of  Guiangan‘s employment agreement with Vintage was to allow him to 
live and work in America and allow Vintage to profit off  of  his work; therefore, the 
purpose of  the contract was not inherently illegal.  Second, the court determined 
that no terms in the contract were inherently illegal.  The court reached this result 
despite Guiangan‘s half-hearted allegation that the term in his contract providing 
Vintage the right to report him to immigration officials was illegal.  Based on these 
findings, the court again reversed the trial court and held that Guiangan‘s 
employment agreement did not violate public policy. 
Next, the court determined whether the injunctive relief  fashioned by the 
trial court remained appropriate.  The court held that Vintage could not be enjoined 
from using recruitment materials listing benefits marginally different from those 
actually provided in its employment agreements.  The court reasoned that the actual 
benefits received by Guiangan were greater than those promised to him during 
recruitment.  Thus, there was no evidence of  wrongdoing by Vintage or that the 
practice enjoined by the trial court would harm any future recruits.  As a result, the 
court vacated the injunction that prevented Vintage from using certain recruitment 
material. 
Finally, the court affirmed the injunction issued by the trial court, which 
provided that Vintage could no longer threaten to report its employees to 
immigration officials if  they chose to seek other employment in contravention of  
their employment agreement. 
The ruling by the Tennessee Court of  Appeals in this case illustrates two 
important practitioner‘s tips for contract lawyers.  First, this case unequivocally 
provides that affirmative defenses must be pled properly.  If  an attorney fails to do 
so, such a defense will be waived and could result in a negative outcome for a client.  
Second, this case shows the uphill battle an attorney must fight to prove that a 
contract violates public policy.  Here, Guiangan‘s employment agreement gave 
Vintage the right to report him to immigration officials, even though Vintage 
brought him to the country for mutual benefit.  While this may seem unfair, it serves 
as a reminder that either the purpose of  a contract or the terms of  a contract must 
be illegal and not merely unfair for a court to hold that it violates public policy. 
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A contract to bypass a valid stock transfer restriction is unenforceable by the 
seller.  Baugh v. Novak, No. M2008-02438-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 54, 
2009 WL 2474714 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2009). 
By Bryan C. Hathorn 
Baugh v. Novak presents a case where a seller attempted to bypass a stock 
transfer restriction in a sale of  securities.  The buyer of  the securities was a bona fide 
purchaser with no knowledge of  the restriction.  The consideration for the sale was, 
in part, indemnity for a guaranty on a loan the securities were pledged to satisfy.  
When the seller defaulted on the loan, the court held that public policy prevented the 
seller from enforcing a contract bypassing a valid stock transfer restriction. 
In Baugh, Wendell and Laura Baugh (―Baughs‖) originally purchased 
Precision Service, Inc. (―Company‖) through an asset purchase agreement with 
Ronald and Gayla Miller (―Millers‖).  As part of  the agreement, the Millers granted a 
loan to the Company, which was guaranteed by the Baughs.  The loan agreement 
contained a stock transfer restriction whereby shares of  stock or ownership interests 
in the Company could not be transferred without the Millers‘ prior written consent. 
The Baughs subsequently desired to sell an interest in the company to 
Herman and Faith Novak (―Novaks‖).  The Millers, however, would not consent to 
the transfer without an additional loan guaranty from the Novaks.  Nonetheless, the 
Baughs drafted a purchase and indemnification contract whereby the Novaks would 
receive a one-half  ownership in the Company in exchange for a cash payment and 
indemnification on one half  of  the guaranty of  the note to the Millers.  The contract 
warranted that there were no transfer restrictions on the stock, and there was no 
evidence that the Novaks had any notice of  the restriction.  At trial, the Baughs 
acknowledged that the contract was designed to bypass the stock transfer restriction. 
Ultimately, the business failed, the Company defaulted on the loan, and the 
Millers collected from the Baughs on the loan guaranty.  The Baughs sued the 
Novaks to enforce the indemnity provision in the contract, and the lower court 
found the contract to be enforceable.4 
                                                   
4 The lower court resolved a number of  other issues which were not necessary to the appellate 
decision.  The lower court found that there was a contract, the contract was enforceable under the 
statute of  frauds even though the original was lost in a fire, and that the terms of  the contract could 
be established from parol evidence.  Ultimately, the court of  appeals affirmed these results but 
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On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals reversed the trial court and held 
that the contract was unenforceable because it violated public policy.  The legislature 
in Tennessee has set out a clear policy of  allowing reasonable restrictions on stock 
transfers in § 48-16-207(b) of  the Tennessee Code, which states that ―[a] restriction 
on the transfer or registration of  transfer of  shares is valid and enforceable against 
the holder or transferee of  the holder if  the restriction is authorized by this section . 
. . .‖  Permitted purposes include ―any . . . reasonable purpose.‖5  The court ruled 
that a contract designed to undermine the statute permitting stock transfer 
restrictions did not present a reasonable purpose and also violated public policy. 
The situation in this case creates an asymmetry between the buyer and the 
seller of  stock subject to a stock transfer restriction.  When the contract bypasses a 
valid stock transfer restriction, the seller of  the stock cannot enforce the contract.  
The buyer of  the stock—a bona fide purchaser with no knowledge of  the stock 
transfer—can enforce the contract based on the language of  § 48-16-208 of  the 
Tennessee Code, which states that ―a [stock transfer] restriction is not enforceable 
against a person without knowledge of  the restriction.‖  Effectively, a contract which 
bypasses a stock transfer agreement is one that is enforceable at the option of  the 
buyer. 
In the present case, the Millers demanded an additional guaranty from the 
Novaks of  the note to release the transfer restriction.  The requirement of  the 
Millers could have been accomplished by having the Novaks grant the guaranty of  
the note and having the Baughs indemnify the Novaks for half  the loan amount.  
The net result would be the same and the contract for sale would have been 
enforceable, because the Millers would consent to the transfer.  Such a bargain could 
expose the Novaks to additional risk because the Novaks might not be able to collect 
on an indemnification claim against the Baughs.  These additional considerations 
would be factors to be negotiated in the price and terms for the sale of  the business. 
As a practical matter, when there is a valid transfer restriction on stock, the 
seller must comply with all requirements to release the restriction before the transfer.  
In addition to all other requirements for the sale of  securities, an attorney drafting a 
stock purchase agreement must ensure that the stock is freely transferable or that all 
                                                                                                                                           
reversed on other grounds. 
5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-16-207(c)(3). 
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requirements relating to the restriction on stock transfers have been met.  In 
addition, if  the buyer is to be subject to share transfer restrictions, the share transfer 
restrictions must satisfy all of  the requirements of  § 48-16-207 of  the Tennessee 
Code, including conspicuous notation of  the restriction on the shares. 
INSURANCE 
Commencement of  foreclosure proceedings does not constitute an “increase 
in hazard” for notice purposes under a standard mortgage clause in an 
insurance policy.  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 S.W.3d 381 
(Tenn. 2009). 
By Joshua H. Lee 
In U.S. Bank v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co., a case of  first 
impression, the Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether the absence of  notice 
from a lienholder bank to the insurer of  a residence concerning the foreclosure of  
that residence constituted an ―increase in hazard‖ under the standard mortgage 
clause of  the insurance policy.  If  the commencement of  the foreclosure 
proceedings was to indeed qualify as an ―increase in hazard,‖ then a bank‘s coverage 
under that policy would be void in light of  the absence of  the notice.  The court 
subsequently held, however, that the commencement of  foreclosure proceedings does 
not constitute an ―increase in hazard‖ for notice purposes under a standard mortgage 
clause in an insurance policy, nor under Tennessee statutory law, so as to preclude a 
bank‘s right to recovery. 
In U.S. Bank, U.S. Bank (―Bank‖) financed a homeowner‘s ―purchase and was 
designated as the mortgagee for the purposes of  insurance coverage‖ in February 
1999.  Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company (―Farmers‖) subsequently 
issued the homeowner an insurance policy covering fire loss.  That policy contained a 
―standard mortgage clause,‖ as opposed to a ―simple/open clause,‖ that independently 
protected the Bank‘s interest in the property, regardless of  acts concerning the 
property outside the Bank‘s knowledge (such as a change of  ownership).  In 
consideration of  such extensive protection, the Bank was required to notify Farmers 
of  ―any increase in hazard‖ within the Bank‘s knowledge.  No provision of  the 
policy, however, explicitly required the Bank to notify Farmers of  a commencement 
of  foreclose proceedings. 
As might be expected, the homeowner quickly became delinquent in her 
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mortgage payments and the Bank subsequently initiated a foreclosure action upon 
the residence.  The Bank properly and adequately notified the homeowner of  this 
proceeding, but failed to notify Farmers.  The homeowner subsequently filed for 
bankruptcy, which initiated an automatic stay upon the foreclosure process.  Six 
months later, the residence at issue was destroyed by a fire which prompted the Bank 
to submit a claim to Farmers to recover their interest in the residence.  Farmers 
refused to pay, however, claiming that the Bank voided its protection under the 
policy by failing to notify Farmers of  the foreclosure proceedings, an ―increase in 
hazard‖ according to Farmers.  The Bank disagreed with such a broad interpretation 
of  ―increase in hazard‖ and brought suit, claiming, among other things, bad faith 
refusal to pay an insurance claim and ―unfair or deceptive practices under the 
Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.‖ 
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the commencement of  
the foreclosure proceedings did not constitute an ―increase in hazard‖ for notice 
purposes under the standard mortgage clause in the insurance policy, nor under 
Tennessee statutory law.  In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the facts at 
issue independently under both the insurance policy and § 56-7-804 of  the 
Tennessee Code. 
First, the court noted that insurance policies are subject to the same general 
rules of  construction as contracts and therefore ―should be interpreted and enforced 
as written‖ absent fraud or mistake.  Addressing the policy at issue, the court quickly 
noted that the parties to the policy chose to employ a ―standard mortgage clause,‖ 
rather than a ―simple/open clause.‖  That election provided expansive coverage for 
the Bank as lienholder, ―regardless of  the actions of  the insured borrower,‖ such as 
becoming delinquent in mortgage payments.  In consideration of  this expansive 
coverage, the court made special note of  the Bank‘s explicit agreement to ―notify 
[Farmers] of  any change of  ownership or occupancy or any increase in hazard of  
which the [Bank] has knowledge.‖  The court, however, found no explic it duty of  the 
Bank to notify Farmers of  any commencement of  foreclosure proceedings in the 
policy.  Thus, the court next addressed Farmers‘ contention that the commencement 
of  foreclosure proceedings was an ―increase in hazard‖ under the policy. 
Although no Tennessee court had yet specifically addressed whether the 
commencement of  foreclosure proceedings could be deemed an ―increase in 
hazard‖ under an insurance policy, the court found one 1901 Tennessee Supreme 
Court case very instructive.  In that case, the court concluded that the 
commencement of  foreclosure proceedings at issue did not require invalidation of  
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insurance coverage because the ―initiation of  foreclosure proceedings did not 
necessarily affect the insurer‘s risk.‖ 
Additionally, the court noted that other jurisdictions had reached similar 
conclusions on the issue.  In a case dealing with extremely similar facts to U.S. Bank, 
the Supreme Court of  Indiana, for example, explicitly rejected the classification of  
an initiation of  foreclosure proceedings as an ―increase in hazard.‖  That Indiana 
court reasoned that if  the insurance company had wished to be notified of  such 
activity, it should have expressly stipulated for such a notice in the policy.  In line 
with that mandate, the court cited multiple other jurisdictions that had strictly 
enforced insurance policy provisions explicitly requiring notice of  foreclosure 
proceedings, thus evidencing widespread foresight regarding the issue. 
In light of  these persuasive decisions and the absence of  explicit language in 
the Farmers policy requiring notice of  the commencement of  foreclosure 
proceedings, the court held that the Bank was not required to give such notice to 
Farmers.  Accordingly, the court held that, under the policy, the lack of  notice on 
behalf  of  the Bank did not invalidate the Bank‘s insurance coverage.  
Given that the language of  § 56-7-804 of  the Tennessee Code mirrors that 
of  a ―standard mortgage clause,‖ the court‘s subsequent statutory analysis was 
extremely similar to that under the policy itself. The court again refused to classify 
the commencement of  foreclosure proceedings as an ―increase of  hazard‖
6 under 
the statute.  Rather, the court chose to employ the ―plain and ordinary‖ meaning of  
the phrase requiring physical change in the property that increases the probability 
that the property will be destroyed which excludes the commencement of  
foreclosure proceedings in the court‘s opinion, and in other jurisdictions‘ opinions, as 
well. 
Practitioners should thus be mindful, as always, in drafting insurance policy 
provisions concerning activities that will serve as an ―increase in hazard‖ to the 
property.  Specifically, if  an insurance company desires to condition a loss payee‘s 
coverage on the notification of  any commencement of  foreclosure proceedings, that 
demand should be made explicit in the policy agreement.  Moreover, if  an insurance 
company wishes to immediately void any and all coverage in the event of  such 
                                                   
6
 The court held the statutory phrase ―increase of  hazard‖ to be synonymous with the policy phrase 
―increase in hazard.‖ 
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proceedings, a provision to that effect should most certainly be explicitly included in 
the policy agreement.  In more general terms, if  an insurance company wishes to 
classify occurrences that do not physically affect the insured residence, as to increase 
the probability of  damage to the residence, as an ―increase in hazard‖ under the 
policy, such classifications must be explicit in the policy agreement. 
In closing, the Tennessee Supreme Court has indicated that it will construe 
the phrase ―increase in hazard‖ quite narrowly and will not supplement a policy 
through broadening this phrase.  Any argument in favor of  such broadening is likely 
a waste of  both a practitioner‘s time and a client‘s resources, unless the practitioner 
can prove that the actions (or omitted actions) at bar caused a physical change in the 
property that increased the probability that the property would be destroyed. 
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT 
Where an individual is an employee at-will, execution of  an employment 
contract under duress is immaterial to its implementation.  Cummings, Inc. v. 
Dorgan, No. M2008-00593-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 639, 2009 WL 
3046979 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2009). 
By Jennifer L. Milam 
In Cummings, Inc. v. Dorgan, the threshold issue was whether a contract signed 
by an employee under the threat of  termination constituted duress.  Whether a 
contract alters the original employment agreement or merely changes the outlined 
compensation will determine whether employment at-will exists; and if  employment 
at-will is present, then duress is irrelevant.  In the present case, whether Dorgan 
(―Defendant‖) was entitled to damages for commission payments and unpaid 
vacation days hinged on the appellate court‘s understanding of  Defendant‘s 
employment and whether he was forced to sign a revised contract limiting the 
aforementioned benefits.  If  Defendant operated as an employee at-will, then 
Cummings, Inc.‘s (―Plaintiff ‖) legal right to termination trumped any assertion of  
duress.  Because Plaintiff  and Defendant agreed that employment at-will governed 
the relationship, the crucial issue became whether a revised contract between the 
parties changed this relationship.  To understand the significance of  the document‘s 
characterization, it is necessary to examine the factual circumstances of  the case.  
In Cummings, Inc., Defendant was employed as a salesperson by Plaintiff  from 
January 1987 until January 2006.  During his 19-year employment, Defendant 
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managed YUM! Brands, Inc., one of  Plaintiff ‘s major clients.  In 1998, Defendant 
signed a contract (the ―Original Contract‖) with Plaintiff, which laid out the terms of  
his employment, compensation for commissions, and a non-compete clause.  In July 
2004, Defendant was asked to sign a revised contract (the ―Revised Contract‖), 
which contained significant differences pertaining to Defendant‘s compensation for 
commissions.  The Revised Contract also extended the non-compete clause for an 
additional one-year period.  Both the Original and Revised Contracts stated that 
Defendant could be terminated ―at any time for cause without advance notice.‖ 
In 2004, Defendant was presented with another contract (the ―2004 
Contract‖), which he resisted signing based on significant compensation disparities.  
According to Defendant, he relented to Plaintiff ‘s pressures to sign the 2004 
Contract based on the threat of  termination.  Shortly after signing the 2004 
Contract, Plaintiff  requested that Defendant relocate to Nashville to be closer to 
Plaintiff ‘s headquarters.  When Defendant declined, Plaintiff  terminated Defendant‘s 
supervision of  YUM! Brands.  Shortly thereafter, in January 2006, Defendant 
tendered his resignation. 
A competitor company hired Defendant, and Defendant began soliciting 
business of  YUM! Brands on behalf  of  his new employer.  In response, Plaintiff  
filed the instant lawsuit, charging Defendant with breach of  the 2004 Contract, 
including breach of  the non-compete agreement.  The trial court granted a 
preliminary injunction to prevent Defendant‘s further solicitation of  YUM! Brands.  
In response, Defendant claimed breach of  contract, tortious interference with his 
business relationship, and violation of  § 50-2-103(a)(3) of  the Tennessee Code for 
Plaintiff ‘s failure to compensate Defendant for his accrued vacation days. 
Upon consideration of  the facts, the trial court held that Defendant signed 
the 2004 Contract under duress, thus voiding the document.  As a result, Plaintiff  
was required to pay damages to Defendant for unpaid compensation.  The trial 
court, however, upheld the validity of  the revised non-compete agreement and 
ordered Defendant to cease solicitation of  business from YUM! Brands until 
expiration of  the requisite two-year period.  Plaintiff  appealed the trial court‘s 
determination that Defendant signed the Revised Contract under duress, resulting in 
Plaintiff ‘s liability for commission compensation under the Original Contract. 
Tennessee courts have long recognized that contracts, even if  valid, cannot 
be enforced if  the contracting party acted under duress.  Duress exists ―when one by 
the unlawful act of  another is induced to make a contract or perform some other act 
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which deprives him of  the exercise of  free will.‖  Contracts are valid only if  the 
document was ―entered into freely, with the voluntary assent of  the parties making 
it.‖  Both physical and economic duress will nullify a contract. 
Tennessee courts only void contracts made under duress if  the party 
asserting the contract does not have a legal right to exercise the threatened assertion.  
For instance, employment-at-will ―recognizes the right of  either the employer or the 
employee to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for good cause, bad 
cause, or no cause at all, without being guilty of  a legal wrong.‖  Tennessee courts 
assume employment at-will exists unless a term within the contract states to the 
contrary. 
Based on the significance of  employment at-will to the establishment of  
duress, the court interpreted the revised contract to determine whether Defendant 
was an employee at-will.  If  the contract‘s language is clear and unambiguous, ―then 
its literal meaning controls the outcome of  a contract dispute, and the court may not 
look beyond the four corners of  the contract to ascertain the parties‘ intention.‖  
However, if  the contract‘s language is ambiguous, then ―a court may look beyond the 
four corners of  the document and consider extrinsic evidence in order to determine 
the parties‘ intention . . . .‖ 
In the present case, the court examined the subject document to determine 
whether its terms clearly and unambiguously constituted an employment contract.  
The court noted that the Original Contract, the Revised Contract, and the 2004 
Contract were not titled as employment agreements.  The 2004 Contract‘s language 
failed to establish whether an employment contract was intended.  For instance, the 
document contained a statement that it was ―not an Agreement to employ 
[Defendant] for any specified length of  time.‖  However, another provision noted 
that Defendant could only be terminated for cause, which is indicative of  an 
employment agreement. 
Based on these disparities, the court concluded that the 2004 Contract was 
ambiguous; thus it was forced to look beyond the literal language of  the document 
and ―consider the rules of  construction and extrinsic evidence of  the parties‘ intent.‖   
Trial testimony from Plaintiff ‘s representatives and Defendant revealed that the 2004 
Contract was understood to be a compensation agreement, not an employment 
agreement.  All parties agreed that Defendant was an employee at-will.  Defendant, 
however, argued that despite his at-will employment, the Revised Contract‘s 
compensation provisions, rather than the provisions within the 2004 Contract, 
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should be followed since the latter contract was signed under duress.  The Tennessee 
Court of  Appeals disagreed. 
Following its analysis, the court reversed the trial court‘s holding that the 
2004 Contract was executed by Defendant under duress, and was therefore 
unenforceable.7  Because the court determined that Defendant was an employee at-
will, it held that execution under duress was immaterial to the contract‘s 
implementation.  Thus, the court held that thee 2004 Contract remained in full force 
and effect throughout Defendant‘s employment.  Since the contract was effectual, 
the court remanded the case to the trial court to address Defendant‘s claims that 
Plaintiff  breached the revised contract by ceasing to pay Defendant‘s commissions. 
The holding in Cummings, Inc. v. Dorgan is a warning to transactional attorneys 
to prepare documents with care and detail.  If  the contracts in this case had been 
explicitly labeled as employment or compensation agreements, and had used 
consistent wording throughout, then the court would not have ventured outside the 
four corners of  the document in its analysis.  Clearly, this appellate court‘s reliance 
on the contract and interpretations of  its literal meaning underscores the importance 
of  careful, meticulous contract drafting.  Transactional attorneys must heed the 
analysis in the present case, and note the significance associated with revised 
contracts regarding employment details and principles of  employment at-will.  The 
drafting attorney should avoid speculative judicial scrutiny of  contracts by clearly 
labeling the document, especially if  the contract contains revisions intended to 
change the nature of  the agreement. 
In Cummings, Inc. the employer was fortunate that the parties‘ intentions 
aligned with the document‘s purpose.  This, however, will not always be the case.  
The subject employer only succeeded in avoiding damages because Defendant failed 
to understand how his employment at-will nullified his own claims.  Aside from 
providing a valuable lesson in the importance of  unambiguous contract drafting, the 
ultimate significance of  the present case will be more clearly understood following 
remand and the trial court‘s examination of  Defendant‘s claim regarding Plaintiff ‘s 
possible breach of  the now judicially supported, and enforceable, 2004 Contract. 
                                                   
7 As a result of  this holding, the other issues raised by Plaintiff  were irrelevant. Also, the issues raised 
by Defendant pertaining to his compensation for commissions and payment for accrued vacation 
days, were undermined by the holding. 
2010]                                       CASE COMMENTARIES                                                      253 
REAL ESTATE 
Where a lease contains an option to renew, but does not specifically prescribe 
the time and method for exercising the option, the lessee may exercise it by 
retaining control of  the property after expiration of  the original lease term 
and paying the required rent in a timely manner.   Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse 
Residuary Trust, No. E2009-654-COA-RM-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 414, 2009 
WL 1871930; 2009 WL 1871930 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009). 
By Ryan W. Barry 
In Ellis v. Sprouse Residuary Trust, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals addressed 
whether the statute of  frauds requires preparation of  a second written instrument to 
renew a written lease agreement where the agreement includes an option to renew, 
but does not specify how or when the option must be exercised.  The court also 
addressed whether a plaintiff ‘s own testimony is sufficient evidence to support a 
claim for compensatory and punitive damages despite the plaintiff  corroborating 
such evidence with hearsay testimony.  On remand, the court held that the statute of  
frauds did not require preparation of  a new lease after the tenant had effectively 
exercised his option to renew.  The court also held that the tenant‘s own testimony 
was sufficient evidence to support a claim for compensatory and punitive damages, 
regardless of  corroborating hearsay testimony. 
In Ellis, Mike Ellis was an experienced farmer who grew crops on his 177-
acre farm, and on an additional 800-900 acres of  leased land.  In 1997, Ellis entered 
a written, five-year lease agreement (―Agreement‖) for 103 acres of  farmland 
(―Property‖) signed by himself  and the owner of  the Property, Mary Bagwell.  Of  
the 103 acres, only 60 were suitable for farming.  The lease was set to expire on 
December 31, 2001.  Ellis had an option to renew the lease for an additional five-
year period, but the Agreement did not specify how or when the option was to be 
exercised.  Each year from 1997 to 2004, Ellis paid the annual lease fee in a timely 
manner and farmed 60 acres of  the Property.  Bagwell accepted each annual 
payment. 
Kerry M. Sprouse was an experienced real estate salesman and developer 
who purchased the Property from Bagwell in 2004.  Ellis informed Sprouse that he 
had a lease on the Property through December 2006 and that the 60 farmable acres 
were currently planted in corn.  Shortly thereafter, Sprouse drove an automobile 
across the field of  waist-high corn, prompting Ellis to seek retribution from Sprouse 
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for damage to his crop.  Sprouse told Ellis he would be allowed to harvest what was 
left of  his crop, after which he must vacate the Property.  Furthermore, Sprouse 
warned Ellis that if  he ―caused any trouble, [Sprouse] would plow under his then-
existing crop.‖  Ellis then vacated the property and prepared to file suit. 
Ellis filed suit against Sprouse, seeking compensatory damages for trespass in 
2004 and for lost profits in 2005 and 2006 resulting from Sprouse‘s violation of  the 
renewed lease by forcing Ellis to vacate the Property in 2004.  A jury found that Ellis 
had effectively renewed the lease through December 2006, and awarded him 
compensatory damages of  $534 for trespass in 2004 and $82,000 for lost profits in 
2005 and 2006.  The compensatory awards were equal to the exact amount that Ellis 
projected as his losses.  The jury also awarded $30,000 in punitive damages based 
solely on testimony from Ellis that Sprouse had taken no steps to remedy his 
wrongdoings and that he had incurred $17,000 in attorney‘s fees. 
Sprouse appealed to the Tennessee Court of  Appeals, which affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the trial court.  The court affirmed 
the compensatory award of  $534 for trespass.  The court, however, found that Ellis 
could not exercise his option to renew the lease by actions taken after the original 
lease had expired.  Ellis therefore had no right to occupy and use the Property in 
2005 and 2006; hence the court reversed the $82,000 award for lost profits.  Finally, 
the court found that although a punitive award was justified, $30,000 was excessive in 
light of  a mere $534 in compensatory damages.  Therefore, the court vacated the 
punitive award and remanded for a new trial regarding the sole issue of  punitive 
damages for the 2004 trespass. 
Ellis filed application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme 
Court, which granted permission and reversed and remanded.  The Court relied on 
its previous ruling in Carhart v. White Mantel & Tile Co., 123 S.W. 747 (Tenn. 1909) to 
hold that Ellis had effectively exercised his option to renew the lease through 2006.  
Under Carhart, when a lease contains an option to renew but does not specifically 
prescribe the time and method for exercising the option, the lessee may exercise the 
option by remaining in possession of  the property after expiration of  the initial lease 
term and by paying the required rent in a timely manner.  On the contrary, a lessee 
must exercise an option to renew before expiration of  the original lease term only 
when the option specifically requires the lessee to do so.  Using the Carhart standard, 
the Court reversed the ruling that Ellis had failed to effectively renew the lease.  
Upon request by Sprouse, the Court remanded to the Court of  Appeals for 
consideration of  several issues, including whether the statute of  frauds requires 
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preparation of  a new lease when exercising an option to renew and whether Ellis 
presented sufficient evidence to support his claim for lost profits and for punitive 
damages. 
On remand, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the judgment of  the 
trial court in its entirety, which entailed $82,534 in compensatory damages and 
$30,000 in punitive damages.  In order to affirm the trial court‘s ruling, the court first 
had to resolve whether the statute of  frauds requires preparation of  a new written 
instrument to renew an earlier lease agreement.  The court relied on Womble v. Walker, 
181 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1944), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court held that where a 
lessee effectively exercises a written, signed option to renew a lease, all the conditions 
and covenants of  the former lease continue and therefore render the need for a new 
lease unnecessary.  Before the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the present case, 
it ruled that Ellis effectively exercised his option to renew the lease.  Therefore, using 
the Womble standard, the court held that the terms of  the original lease continued for 
an additional five years and that the statute of  frauds did not apply. 
Next, the court turned to whether Ellis presented sufficient evidence to 
support his claim for lost profits.  Sprouse argued that estimates of  lost profits were 
based solely on statements made to Ellis by out-of-court parties; thus all evidence 
was hearsay testimony and the jury verdict could not stand.  The court noted, 
however, that Ellis drew from his own experience as a farmer to present lost profits 
estimates and that he only noted testimony from outside sources as a means of  
corroborating his own findings.  Previous case law provides that a farmer‘s own 
testimony regarding lost profits is competent proof  of  damages and that the 
credibility and weighing of  such testimony must be left to the jury.  Here, the jury 
weighed Ellis‘s testimony and found in his favor; thus the court found no reason to 
alter the trial court‘s decision to submit Ellis‘s proof  of  damages to the jury.  
Finally, the court addressed whether Ellis presented sufficient evidence to 
support his claim for punitive damages.  Sprouse argued that punitive damages were 
not proper because Ellis only proved nominal damages of  $534.  As noted above, 
however, on remand the court determined Ellis proved an additional $82,000 in 
compensatory damages for lost profits.  The court therefore found no reason to alter 
the award of  $30,000 in punitive damages as excessive.  The court further noted that 
Ellis‘s testimony that Sprouse threatened to plow under his crops was sufficient 
evidence to allow the jury to conclude that Sprouse had the conscious objective of  
removing Ellis from the Property regardless of  his rights.  The court therefore 
affirmed the trial court‘s punitive award of  $30,000. 
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Ellis illustrates the importance of  detail and clarity in drafting real property 
lease agreements. A lease containing an option to renew must be clear as to how and 
when the option is to be exercised.  Otherwise, the default rule set forth in Carhart – 
which is affirmed in Ellis – clearly provides that the lessee need only continue 
possession of  the property and payment of  rent to renew the lease.  Furthermore, 
the statute of  frauds does not require a new written agreement when an option is 
exercised in such a manner; rather, the original lease terms continue to control.  To 
avoid possible confusion and disputes, Tennessee attorneys should advise their 
clients to specifically define in the lease both how and when a lessee must exercise an 
option to renew. 
Finally, Ellis briefly draws attention to the fact that a plaintiff ‘s testimony 
alone can be enough to send a claim for compensatory and punitive damages to the 
jury despite using hearsay testimony as corroborative evidence.  As such, Tennessee 
defense attorneys must be sure to raise all objections regarding hearsay for specific 
pieces of  evidence and they must advise their clients that threats and other hostile 
words toward the plaintiff  could aid a jury in returning a verdict for the plaintiff. 
SECURITIES 
A private right of  action exists for violations of  § 10(b) of  and Rule 10b-5 
under the Securities Exchange Act where a plaintiff  can establish a material 
misrepresentation by the defendant, scienter, a relationship between the 
misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of  a security, reliance upon the 
misrepresentation, economic loss, and loss causation.  Ind. State Dist. Council of  
Laborers v. Omnicare, Inc., 583 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2009). 
By Andrew Sumner 
The issue presented in Indiana State District Council of  Laborers v. Omnicare, Inc. 
dealt with whether securities investors could recover damages resulting from 
fraudulent and misleading statements issued by a major corporation.  Although § 
10(b) of  and Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of  1934, as amended 
(the ―Act‖), prohibit ―fraudulent, material misstatements in connection with the sale 
or purchase of  a security,‖ proving that a company actually issued fraudulent 
statements, establishing a relationship between the fraudulent statements and 
subsequent damages, and determining when certain exceptions apply can be difficult.  
Here, the United States Court of  Appeals for the Sixth Circuit looked at the nature 
of  a corporation‘s misleading statements and determined that the corporation was 
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not liable for several reasons.  Specifically, the court found that the statements were 
entitled to safe-harbor protection from liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because 
the statements were ―forward looking,‖ that the statements were not material 
because they were ―mere corporate puffery,‖ and that the plaintiffs failed to establish 
a relationship between the corporation‘s statements and a subsequent drop in the 
corporation‘s stock price. 
In Omnicare, investors who had purchased Omnicare, Inc. (―Omnicare‖) 
securities between August 2, 2005 and July 25, 2006 (―Plaintiffs‖), brought a class-
action suit against Omnicare, a national pharmaceutical provider, along with several 
of  its officers and board members, claiming that Omnicare violated § 10(b) of  and 
Rule 10b-5 under the Act.  The Plaintiffs maintained that in anticipation of  an 
upcoming industry-wide transition to Medicare Part D, Omnicare issued deceptive 
press releases and made misleading conference calls on August 3 and November 2, 
2005.  In each communication, Omnicare emphasized that it was prepared for the 
Medicare Part D transition and stated that it had been working extensively to educate 
its employees and potential prescription drug plan providers about the transition.  
Plaintiffs contended that these statements were misleading because, in actuality, 
Omnicare had failed to take the necessary steps to prepare itself  for the Part D 
transition, and that as a result, Omnicare was forced to spend an additional $9.8 
million on the transition. 
Next, Plaintiffs alleged that Omnicare committed fraud by failing to disclose 
an ongoing contractual dispute with United Health Group (―UHG‖), a major 
prescription drug plan provider.  Plaintiffs further claimed that because Omnicare 
did not reveal the dispute until May 18, 2006, growth predictions issued by Omnicare 
in February and April 2006 were misleading. 
In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that Omnicare failed to comply with generally 
accepted accounting principles (―GAAP‖) when it issued statements reporting 
record revenues in 2005 and early 2006.  Plaintiffs claimed that such figures were 
artificially inflated because of  ―improper revenue recognition, . . . overvaluation and 
improper recognition of  receivables, . . . overvaluation of  inventories, and . . . the 
failure to establish, in a timely manner, litigation settlement reserves with respect to 
government investigations.‖ 
Lastly, Plaintiffs challenged the lawfulness of  Omnicare‘s drug recycling and 
drug substitution programs.  Within these programs, Plaintiffs alleged that Omnicare 
illegally repackaged drugs with different expiration dates and also replaced less 
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expensive doses of  medications with more costly doses.  Plaintiffs asserted that, 
because these programs were illegal, Omnicare made materially misleading 
statements when it assured investors that it was complying with the law.  Plaintiffs 
noted that after these assurances were made, the government raided Omnicare‘s 
facilities several times, resulting in Omnicare settling two lawsuits for $52.5 million 
and $49.5 million, respectively. 
Pursuant to § 10(b) of  and Rule 10b-5 under the Act, a plaintiff  has a right 
of  action if  he or she can prove the following: that the defendant made a material 
misrepresentation; that a relationship existed between the material misrepresentation 
and the acquisition of  the security; reliance on the misrepresentation; economic loss; 
and loss causation.  A plaintiff  can prove loss causation by establishing a relationship 
between the misrepresentation and any subsequent economic loss.  A plaintiff  must 
also show scienter, which requires that the plaintiff  ―state with particularity facts 
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of  
mind.‖  Next, a plaintiff  must identify the speaker and the misrepresentations, 
establish when and where the misrepresentations were made, and explain why he or 
she considered the statements material and fraudulent.  Materiality may be 
demonstrated by establishing, with a substantial likelihood, ―that the disclosure of  
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‗total mix‘ of  information available.‖  
Exceptions to these rules absolve companies from liability if  the statements 
involve ―mere corporate puffery‖ or ―corporate optimism.‖  The exceptions also 
protect corporate projections and estimates concerning future economic 
performance with a safe harbor.  Such statements are only fraudulent if  they are 
material, if  the defendant had actual knowledge that the statements were 
misrepresentations, and if  the communications did not include future projections or 
―meaningful cautionary statements.‖ 
In this case, the district court granted Omnicare‘s motion to dismiss and 
found that Plaintiffs‘ allegations concerning Omnicare issuing misleading Medicare 
Part D preparedness statements and violating GAAP were not sufficient because 
Plaintiffs failed to prove loss causation.  The district court also found that 
Omnicare‘s statements concerning the legality of  its actions were ―soft,‖ that 
disclosure of  such actions was not required, and that no inference of  scienter 
existed.  Finally, the district court found that because the lead Plaintiff  sold its 
securities before any misleading communications were issued, the Plaintiffs had no 
standing to sue Omnicare concerning its failure to reveal the UHG contract dispute.  
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On appeal, the United States Court of  Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed 
each of  the above district court decisions.  Concerning Omnicare‘s alleged 
misrepresentations about its Medicare Part D preparedness, the court agreed that 
Plaintiffs failed to show loss causation, noting that instead of  explaining how or why 
Omnicare‘s misrepresentations had caused a drop in the value of  its stock, Plaintiffs 
attributed the decrease in the stock‘s value to the government raids on Omnicare‘s 
facilities.  Similarly, the court found that Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead loss 
causation when proving that Omnicare violated GAAP.  Although Plaintiffs 
presented multiple violations, the court found that the complaint failed to show how 
or when any of  the violations were ―recognized by or revealed to the market.‖  
Next, regarding Plaintiffs‘ claims that  Omnicare failed to disclose its dispute 
with UHG, the court found that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the requirements of  § 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5 because Plaintiffs did not allege a material misstatement or omission 
and never explained why Omnicare was obligated to reveal its contract dispute with 
UHG earlier than it did.  The court also held that because Omnicare‘s statements 
were ―forward-looking,‖ the statements were protected by a safe harbor, and that 
because the statements were ―mere corporate puffery,‖ they were not material. 
Lastly, the court rejected Plaintiffs‘ allegations that Omnicare made 
misrepresentations through claims of  legal compliance, stating that ―companies have 
no duty to opine about the legality of  their own actions.‖  The court also found that 
because Omnicare made a ―generic claim that they complied with the law without 
any specifics,‖ such information was ―soft‖ and ―no disclosure [was] required despite 
the generalized claim of  ‗legal compliance.‘‖  Although a company may be liable if  it 
issues a claim of  legal compliance with actual knowledge of  the claim‘s falsity, in this 
case the court held that Plaintiffs did not show that Omnicare knew its claims were 
false. 
As the court‘s decision in Indiana State District Council of  Laborers v. Omnicare, 
Inc. demonstrates, a plaintiff  and his or her counsel should never forget that loss 
causation must be established in order to recover damages resulting from a 
corporation‘s fraudulent statements.  To adequately prove loss causation, attorneys 
should advise their clients that a causal connection between a corporation‘s material 
misrepresentation and any subsequent loss must exist.  Likewise, plaintiffs‘ attorneys 
should inform their clients that only material misrepresentations or omissions by a 
corporation generate a right of  action for violation of  § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and 
that a plaintiff  must also establish scienter, a relationship between the 
misrepresentation and the purchase or sale of  a security, reliance upon the 
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misrepresentation, and economic loss.  By failing to take these measures, an investor 
who relies on fraudulent statements to buy or sell corporate securities may be unable 
to recover any resulting damages.  On the other hand, transactional attorneys 
representing corporations should assure their clients that ―forward-looking‖ 
projections and statements of  ―mere corporate puffery‖ or corporate optimism are 
permissible and that such statements do not constitute a violation of  § 10(b) of  and 
Rule 10b-5 under the Act. 
To bring a claim for false and misleading statements under the Tennessee 
Securities Act, a plaintiff  does not have to prove reliance on the 
representations or omissions of  the defendant.  A misstatement or omission is 
“material” for purposes of  the action if  there was a substantial likelihood that 
a reasonable purchaser or seller would have considered it important.  Green v. 
Green, 293 S.W.3d 493 (Tenn. 2009). 
By Will Woods 
Section 48-2-122(a)(2) of  the Tennessee Code, part of  the Tennessee 
Securities Act of  1980 (the ―Act‖), makes it unlawful for any person involved in the 
sale or purchase of  securities to make an ―untrue statement of  a material fact or 
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the 
light of  the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading.‖  The 
rationale behind this statute is to prevent parties from utilizing fraud or 
misrepresentation in transactions.  The language in this statute, however, fails to 
clearly define what constitutes a ―material fact.‖ 
In Green v. Green, the Tennessee Supreme Court attempted to outline the 
parameters of  materiality with regard to securities transactions.  The court also 
attempted to clarify the requirements for bringing a cause of  action for rescission 
due to fraud or misrepresentation.  It held that the right of  action for false and 
misleading statements in a securities transaction under the Act did not require the 
plaintiff  to prove reliance on the representations or omissions of  the defendant.  
The court further held that under the Act, the test for ―materiality‖ of  a 
misstatement or omission was an objective one, and that such a misstatement or 
omission was ―material‖ if  there was a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
purchaser or seller would have considered it important. 
The pertinent facts in Green involve the sale of  22,000 shares of  stock in 
Champs-Elysees, Inc. (the ―Company‖), a closely held and family-operated 
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corporation.  The stock was sold by Edna Green, founder of  the corporation, to 
Wesley Green, Edna‘s son and president of  the corporation.  In October 2005, citing 
the Company‘s continual financial and managerial problems, Wesley attempted to 
purchase Edna‘s 22,000 shares of  the Company‘s stock.  Wesley told Edna that by 
purchasing her 22,000 shares, he would be able to acquire a controlling interest in the 
Company, and would thus be better able to acquire the necessary investment capital 
from external sources to prevent the Company from going bankrupt. 
During several of  the conversations Wesley had with Edna concerning his 
purchase of  the stock, Wesley convinced her that by selling her shares to him, she 
would be released of  any secondary liability to AmSouth Bank for a $75,000 
corporate line of  credit that was extended to the Company.  Although Edna told 
Wesley that she did not believe she would be personally liable for the line of  credit, 
she admitted that after discussing the issue with Wesley, she was convinced that she 
might actually be obligated on the line of  credit.  On October 24, 2005, Edna agreed 
to sell her stock to Wesley, and on October 27, Edna signed a bill of  sale, which 
transferred her 22,000 shares to Wesley for $8,000.  Wesley gave Edna a check for 
$2,000, which served as a down payment on the purchase. 
Mark Green, Wesley‘s brother and a director at the Company, was unaware 
of  Wesley‘s purchase of  Edna‘s stock until after Edna had signed the bill of  sale.  
Upon learning of  the sale, Mark convinced Edna that she should instead consider 
selling her stock to Art Fourier, another director at the company.  Mark claimed that 
Fourier would be able to offer more money than Wesley had in exchange for the 
stock.  On October 28, 2005, the day after Edna signed the bill of  sale, Edna 
delivered a letter to Wesley that rescinded the sale of  her 22,000 shares to him.  In a 
letter to Wesley dated November 2, 2005, Edna returned Wesley‘s down payment 
check of  $2,000. 
Wesley, however, refused to rescind the bill of  sale signed by Edna, and 
claimed in a November 11 board meeting that he had legally acquired Edna‘s stock.  
At the same meeting, Edna claimed that Wesley had induced her into the sale of  the 
stock by representing to her that she would remain personally liable on the 
company‘s line of  credit at AmSouth Bank if  she did not sell her stock to him.  
During this meeting, Wesley was removed as a director and officer of  the 
corporation. 
On November 14, Wesley filed a suit in chancery court in which he sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief  against Edna, Mark, and Fourier, as well as 
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temporary restraining orders to prevent the sale of  any of  the Company‘s stock.   
The court refused to grant the injunction with regard to Edna, concluding that the 
October 27 bill of  sale signed by her was both an unenforceable and unconscionable 
document.  The court also declined to enjoin Edna from selling or transferring her 
stock, holding that (1) the October 27 bill of  sale was invalid on its face; (2) Wesley 
had an adequate remedy at law; and (3) Wesley had failed to demonstrate a 
substantial likelihood of  success on the merits. 
After intervention by the Company on behalf  of  Edna and a subsequent 
counterclaim filed by Wesley, Edna and the Company moved for summary judgment 
on Edna‘s counterclaim for rescission under § 48-2-122(b)(1) of  the Tennessee Code.  
The court granted this motion, ruling that Wesley had violated § 48-2-121(a)(2) based 
on the following: that (1) Wesley had represented to Edna that she was obligated 
under the Company‘s line of  credit at AmSouth Bank; (2) this representation was 
false; (3) this representation was made in connection with the transfer of  Edna‘s 
stock; and (4) when viewed objectively, this representation was material to the 
transaction.  The court also noted that the disagreement over whether Edna had 
relied on Wesley‘s representation was not material with regard to Edna‘s rescission 
claim.  On appeal, however, the court of  appeals ruled that the chancery court had 
erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of  Edna as to her rescission claim 
under § 48-2-122(b)(1).  The court of  appeals reasoned that rescission claims under 
this section required the claimant to prove reliance on representations made by the 
defendant. 
After a subsequent appeal by Edna and the Company, the Tennessee 
Supreme Court affirmed the holding of  the court of  appeals, although it held that 
the court had erred by inserting a requirement of  reliance into § 48-2-122(b)(1) of  
the Tennessee Code.  Under this section, a seller will be entitled to rescission if: (1) 
the seller returns the consideration received; (2) the seller demonstrates that the 
purchaser violated § 48-2-121(a); (3) the seller proves that he or she was unaware of  
the purchaser‘s violation of  § 48-2-121(a); and (4) the purchaser fails to prove that he 
or she did not know, and in the exercise of  reasonable care could not know, about 
the violations of  § 48-2-122(a).  The court noted that although § 48-2-122(b)(1) 
clearly states that in order to be entitled to rescission, a seller must not be aware that 
a purchaser‘s statements are untrue, neither § 48-2-122(b)(1) nor § 48-2-121(a) 
contain any language that would require a seller to rely on representations made by 
the purchaser. 
Noting the plain language of  the statutes, the court thus refused to insert an 
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implicit reliance requirement as an element of  the right of  action.  The court further 
noted that its interpretation of  the statutes, which allows sellers of  securities in 
Tennessee to use state law to rescind transactions based on fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation without proof  of  reliance, did not conflict with federal law, even 
though a party in a similar situation would be required to prove reliance if  a claim 
was being pursued in a United States District Court. 
In addition to resolving the issue of  reliance, the court also delineated the 
standard for materiality with regards to § 48-2-121(a)(2).  The statute prohibits the 
making of  any ―untrue statement of  a material fact‖ or failure to ―state a material 
fact.‖  The court first held that the test for the materiality of  a statement or omission 
is an objective one, explaining that the basic test of  materiality in the context of  
securities law is ―whether an average reasonable person would attach importance to 
the misinformation in determining his choice of  action in the transaction in 
question.‖ 
The court then addressed the issue of  whether a finding of  materiality 
requires that the purchaser or seller in question ―would‖ or simply ―might‖ consider 
the given misinformation as being important in making a decision.  The court held 
that the proper test for determining the materiality of  a given representation or 
omission is the ―substantial likelihood‖ standard, which states that misinformation or 
omission of  a fact is material if  there is ―a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
purchaser or seller would consider it important in deciding whether or not to 
purchase or sell.‖ 
The Tennessee Supreme Court‘s ruling in Green clarifies the elements 
necessary for filing suit under the Act.  For one, Green demonstrates that a plaintiff  is 
not required to prove reliance on representations or omissions made by the 
defendant in a claim for false and misleading statements in a securities transaction.  
Also, the ruling elucidates the framework for determining materiality in an action for 
false and misleading statements under the Act.  The test of  materiality is an 
―objective‖ one, which makes a statement or omission material if  there is a 
―substantial likelihood that a reasonable purchaser or seller would consider it 
important.‖ 
Transactional attorneys should familiarize themselves with this standard, and 
therefore enable themselves to better evaluate representations or omissions made by 
clients and other parties to a given transaction.  Transactional attorneys should also 
advise their clients to take additional precautions when making representations to 
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third parties, as reliance is no longer required to be proven under the Act. 
TAX 
A corporation may be subject to franchise and excise taxes on its advertising 
revenues derived from publications distributed within the state, even though 
the corporation’s business activity is performed substantially outside the 
state.  BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp. v. Chumley, No. M2008-01929-COA-R3-CV, 
2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 576, 2009 WL 2632773 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2009). 
By Emily Leebron Foster 
Corporations are subject to franchise and excise taxes for the privilege of  
doing business in Tennessee.  For corporations conducting business and deriving 
income from multiple states, the proportion of  the corporation‘s earnings subject to 
Tennessee franchise and excise taxes are determined according to §§ 67-4-2012 
(excise) and 67-4-2111 (franchise) of  the Tennessee Code.  If  specific and unusual 
circumstances exist, however, the Commissioner may impose an alternative equitable 
method for apportioning a corporation‘s earnings for the purpose of  determining its 
franchise and excise tax obligations.  In BellSouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. 
Chumley, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that the Commissioner was justified 
when she deviated from the statutory formulas in determining the corporation‘s 
taxes related to its advertising income derived from publications distributed, but not 
produced, within Tennessee. 
The Uniform Division of  Income for Tax Purposes Act (―UDITPA‖), 
adopted by Tennessee, provides a basis for the allocation and apportionment of  
taxes for corporations doing business in multiple states.  In Tennessee, the overall 
apportionment ratio is based upon the proportion of  assets, payroll, and sales 
attributable to the business conducted and income derived in the state.  Of  particular 
interest in BellSouth is the applicability of  the sales factor for advertising services, 
which are classified as sales other than sales of  tangible personal property.  Under §§ 
67-4-2012(i)(2) and 67-4-2111(i)(2) of  the Tennessee Code, Tennessee applies the 
cost of  performance method for these types of  sales to determine whether the sales 
factor is included in the overall apportionment ratio.  For example, if  a greater 
proportion of  the corporation‘s business activities are performed outside of  the 
state, then the sales are not deemed as sales within the state for purposes of  
franchise and excise taxes.  Under these circumstances, the sales factor element of  
the apportionment ratio is zero. 
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BellSouth Advertising and Publishing Corporation (―BellSouth‖) generated 
approximately $897 million in advertising income from the production and 
distribution of  its telephone directories in Tennessee  between 1997-2001, and paid 
only $296,140 (0.03%) in franchise and excise taxes.  BellSouth contended that the 
proper basis for determining whether the advertising revenue was apportioned to 
Tennessee for purposes of  franchise and excise taxes was the cost of  performance 
method.  BellSouth emphasized that for the earnings it generated from its advertising 
services in Tennessee, the sales activities, although conducted in Tennessee, were not 
conducted by BellSouth employees, but rather by independent contractors who were 
subject to Tennessee franchise and excise taxes.  Additionally, the company 
conducted substantially all of  its production activities for the directories outside of  
Tennessee.  Thus, based on the Tennessee statutory formulas and cost of  
performance methodology, BellSouth excluded the revenues from advertising 
services from the sales factor in the apportionment ratio. 
Under § 67-4-2014 of  the Tennessee Code, however, the Commissioner is 
granted discretion to determine whether a variance to the statutory formula and 
methodology is appropriate.  Thus, in 2004, the Tennessee Commissioner issued a 
variance to BellSouth‘s franchise and excise taxes for the period 1997-2001 to better 
reflect the extent of  BellSouth‘s business activities in the state.  The variance was 
based on a sales factor that included the advertising revenue generated from the 
directories distributed in Tennessee, rather than the cost of  performance method.  
The Commissioner determined that the resulting increase in BellSouth‘s franchise 
and excise taxes for the five-year period was nearly $10 million, plus interest of  
approximately $3 million.  The issue before the Tennessee Court of  Appeals was 
whether the Commissioner‘s tax assessment, which apportioned BellSouth‘s revenue 
using a sales factor based on BellSouth‘s Tennessee advertising revenues rather than 
cost of  performance, was proper in determining BellSouth‘s franchise and excise tax 
liability. 
On appeal, the court held that the Commissioner was justified in issuing a 
variance to BellSouth for franchise and excise taxes based on advertising revenues 
generated within the state, rather than the statutory cost of  performance 
methodology.  The court affirmed the Commissioner‘s discretion in issuing a tax 
variance, and looked to the intent of  UDITPA in evaluating the Commissioner‘s 
specific action.  The court noted that in the development of  UDITPA, the framers 
acknowledged that for some business activities the statutory formulas and underlying 
methodologies would not adequately reflect the extent of  the business activity in the 
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state.  In particular, the framers recognized that taxes on service activities, such as 
advertising services, would warrant a variance from the statutory formula.  The 
aberration with advertising services is that the costs may be incurred in one state 
while the corporation derives its revenues primarily from distribution in other states.  
And under the statutory cost of  performance methodology, although a business 
benefits from the privilege of  doing business within a particular state, it would be 
free from that state‘s franchise and excise taxes. 
Although the court appreciated BellSouth‘s argument that the Commissioner 
could deviate from the cost of  performance methodology simply to generate greater 
tax revenues for the state, the Tennessee rules and regulations explicitly provide for 
such discretionary actions, as long as those actions are justified.  The legislature 
recognized that not all situations will fit nicely into the statutory formulas, and 
therefore, granted the Commissioner authority to deviate when the facts and 
circumstances warrant.  The BellSouth court concluded that the Commissioner 
demonstrated that the variance issued to BellSouth was warranted as BellSouth‘s 
business activities were substantially performed outside the state, but it derived its 
revenues primarily from customers and the distribution of  its product within the 
state. 
The decision in BellSouth affirms the Commissioner‘s discretion in 
determining the basis for the apportionment of  a corporation‘s income for franchise 
and excise taxes.  In particular, corporations may be taxed on advertising revenues 
generated within a particular state, although the corporation performs its production 
and sales activities in another state.  Although the decision in BellSouth affects 
corporations paying franchise and excise taxes in Tennessee, the implications are 
potentially broader as other states that have adopted UDITPA may file suit.  Thus, 
attorneys and tax practitioners in Tennessee and beyond should advise their clients 
of  potential tax obligations under BellSouth, particularly for those clients that provide 
services in multiple states, but the related assets, personnel, and activities are outside 
of  those states. 
Despite statutory formulas, which provide some certainty for businesses, 
corporations doing business in multiple states may be subject to greater franchise 
and excise taxes for certain privileges.  Whether states will aggressively seek to realize 
franchise and excise taxes due to them from companies generating advertising 
income from print medium distributed within their state may be a moot issue.  In 
today‘s world, consumers and businesses rely more on the Internet for their 
purchase-and-sale decisions than on telephone directories or other print sources.  
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Nevertheless, attorneys and tax practitioners should assess whether their clients‘ 
business model will subject them to a potentially greater franchise and excise tax 
liability as determined under BellSouth. 
Income earned outside the state by a non-domiciliary subsidiary corporation 
as a result of  the parent corporation’s redemption of  outstanding stock held 
by the subsidiary is not taxable under Tennessee excise tax law, unless the 
two entities share a unitary business relationship.  Blue Bell Creameries, L.P. v. 
Chumley, No. M2009-00255-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 655, 2009 WL 
3126249 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2009). 
By Erin Jackson Wallen 
State excise tax assessments on income earned outside the state must 
conform to the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of  the United States 
Constitution.  In order to clarify these constitutional requirements, the Supreme 
Court developed the ―unitary business principle‖ as the standard for determining 
what out-of-state income may be taxed.  In Blue Bell Creameries, L.P. v. Chumley, the 
Tennessee Court of  Appeals held that a state excise tax assessment on a non-
domiciliary subsidiary corporation based on out-of-state income earned as a result of  
the parent corporation‘s redemption of  outstanding stock was unconstitutional 
because the subsidiary and its parent corporation did not share a unitary business 
relationship. 
In Blue Bell Creameries, Blue Bell Creameries, USA (―Blue Bell‖), a Delaware 
corporation, formed Blue Bell Creameries, L.P. (the ―Taxpayer‖), a limited 
partnership domiciled in Texas, as part of  a corporate reorganization in 2000.  Blue 
Bell created Taxpayer to assume the business of  Taxpayer‘s predecessor, which 
consisted of  ―producing, selling and distributing ice cream in multiple jurisdictions, 
including Tennessee.‖  The ice cream business was ―controlled, managed, and 
conducted‖ by Taxpayer‘s predecessor prior to the reorganization and by Taxpayer 
afterward.  Blue Bell served as a holding company and parent corporation of  
Taxpayer‘s predecessor and continued to serve the same function for Taxpayer.  Also, 
due to the reorganization, Blue Bell became an S corporation and allowed eligible 
shareholders to contribute their Blue Bell shares to Taxpayer in exchange for a 
limited partnership interest in Taxpayer. 
In 2001, the majority of  Blue Bell‘s shareholders contributed their stock to 
Taxpayer in return for a limited partnership interest, and Blue Bell then made a cash 
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payment to Taxpayer in order to redeem the contributed stock.  This transaction 
produced a capital gain of  $119,909,317 to Taxpayer, which it classified as 
―nonbusiness earnings‖ on its 2001 Tennessee Franchise and Excise Tax Return.  
The Tennessee Department of  Revenue (the ―Department‖), however, deemed the 
capital gain a ―business earning‖ that ―should have been included in Taxpayer‘s 
apportionable income subject to the [Tennessee] excise tax.‖  After losing an 
objection and paying the tax, interest, and penalties allegedly owed, Taxpayer filed 
suit against the Department in 2006, seeking a refund on the ground that the tax 
assessment was unconstitutional. 
The trial court ruled in favor of  Taxpayer, finding that Taxpayer and its 
parent corporation were not part of  a unitary business relationship and that the tax 
assessment was, therefore, unconstitutional.  The Department appealed, arguing that 
the capital gain at issue was constitutionally taxable because the stock acquisition and 
redemption were part of  a unitary business plan between Taxpayer and Blue Bell, in 
that ―everything done by each entity was orchestrated together to further the single 
ice cream business of  which both [were] a part.‖ 
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of  Appeals affirmed the trial court‘s holding 
that Taxpayer and Blue Bell did not share a unitary business relationship and that the 
Department‘s excise tax assessment was, therefore, unconstitutional.  The court first 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court‘s ―unitary business principle‖ is to be used in 
any formula to ―apportion corporate revenues for tax purposes.‖  Under this 
principle, a state may not tax out-of-state income unless it is earned from a business 
activity that is unitary with the taxpayer‘s activity conducted within the state.  
Essentially, a unitary business is one whose parts are too closely connected and 
necessary to each other to warrant distinct consideration as independent units, and 
the courts have created various tests for recognizing such a unitary relationship. 
The court first analyzed Taxpayer‘s case under the ―hallmarks of  a unitary 
relationship‖ test, which requires examination of  several factors such as the 
centralization of  management, the functional integration among the business‘s basic 
operations, and the economies of  scale.  As for the first factor, the court found that 
there was insufficient centralization of  management of  the entities to find a unitary 
business relationship.  Although Blue Bell indisputably owned Taxpayer, and though 
there was evidence of  an overlap in the management of  the entities, the record did 
not show that Blue Bell had sufficient control over Taxpayer‘s activities in Tennessee.  
In fact, the Department admitted that the actual operation of  the ice cream business 
conducted in Tennessee was ―controlled, managed, and conducted‖ by Taxpayer, not 
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Blue Bell. 
Turning to the second factor, the court concluded that Taxpayer and Blue 
Bell were not functionally integrated when the record lacked evidence that Taxpayer 
realized any benefits from the reorganization or the stock redemption which 
―contributed to [its] operations or which [it] depended on in performing its 
operations.‖  Instead, the record indicated that the reorganization was designed solely 
to allow Blue Bell to become an S corporation, obtain favorable tax treatment for its 
remaining shareholders, and avoid registering and reporting expenses.  Additionally, 
the court disagreed with the Department‘s contention that the two entities were 
necessarily functionally integrated, since Blue Bell, as a pure holding company of  
Taxpayer, ―would ‗have no reason to exist‘ without Taxpayer‘s operation.‖  
Dismissing the contention that holding companies are never separate businesses 
from their subsidiaries, the appellate court stated that a holding company and its 
subsidiary must display the requisite interrelationship or interdependence among 
their basic operations in order to be unitary. 
Moreover, the appellate court found that, although a flow of  value between 
the entities may indicate a unitary business, Taxpayer‘s contribution to Blue Bell of  
the income it earned from the ice cream business was insufficient to prove functional 
integration between the entities, because ―one component may ‗add to the riches‘ of  
the corporation and yet remain a discrete business enterprise.‖  
Finally, the court found insufficient economies of  scale to deem the entities 
unitary, given the lack of  evidence showing that Blue Bell had provided ―central 
services,‖ such as staff  functions, payment of  employees‘ salaries, workman‘s 
compensation coverage, or legal services, to Taxpayer in any way that undermined 
Taxpayer‘s ―operational independence.‖  Again, the court emphasized the 
Department‘s own admittance that Taxpayer, not Blue Bell, ―controlled, managed, 
and conducted‖ the actual operation of  the business.  
Upon determining that Taxpayer and its holding company, Blue Bell, did not 
satisfy the hallmarks of  a unitary relationship test, the appellate court considered the 
―operational function‖ test, which the Supreme Court created in recognition of  the 
concept that apportionment might be constitutional in some situations where an 
asset is part of  a taxpayer‘s unitary business, even though no unitary business 
relationship exists between the payor and payee.  Under this test, apportionment 
requires that ―the capital transaction serve an operational rather than an investment 
function.‖  Finding that the capital gain realized by Taxpayer was distributed to its 
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partners, who were entitled to the income since they were in possession of  the stock 
at the time it appreciated, the court held that this capital gain was not used as 
operational funds and was therefore not constitutionally taxable under the 
operational function test. 
The decision in Blue Bell Creameries, L.P. v. Chumley should alert Tennessee 
attorneys to the constitutional limitations imposed when a state seeks to tax a 
taxpayer that conducts business within the state on out-of-state income.  Providing 
insight into the analysis required under the ―unitary business principle,‖ the case 
suggests that a unitary relationship will not exist when a taxpayer that conducts 
activity within the state, rather than its parent or holding corporation or other out-of-
state entity, actually controls, manages, and conducts the operation of  the business.  
Tennessee attorneys should also note that the mere existence of  a parent and 
subsidiary relationship does not necessitate a finding of  a unitary business 
relationship and that the interrelationship or interdependence among the business‘s 
basic operations, as well as the flow of  value or goods between the entities, must be 
scrutinized, as in any other case, in order to determine whether a business is unitary 
and subject to state taxation on out-of-state income. 
